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ABSTRACT
This study develops a general theoretical frameiwork for the analysis of organizational
behavior by focusing on the notion that organizations develop unique information-
processing frameworks, which it labels "organizational images" or "images of
operations," that strongly determine their behavior. The model is then used to draw
inferences about the forms of counterinsurgency strategies practiced by the US military in
the second war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. The paper argues that militaries tend
to view the tasks they undertake in terms of the coercive application of force, and that
this tendency tends to determine the forms of counterinsurgency strategies they chose,
leading them to eschew strategies that rely on bargaining with enemy forces. The
purported dominance of this coercive "image of operations" is then investigated in
military field reports from the war in Afghanistan.
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Title: Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
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In Essence of Decision, Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow's classic work on
foreign policy decision-making, the authors distinguish between three common
paradigms of foreign policy analysis: the rational actor model, the organization theory
model, and the governmental politics model. The rational actor model, quite apart from
the other two, is based on a concise model of human decision-making known as the
rational choice model. Borrowed from economic theory, the rational choice model is a
pithy description of human behavior based on a few simple variables. It has had a
profound influence on the recent course of political science, becoming for many the basis
of their methodological approach to wide-ranging research questions across the many
areas of research in the discipline, both in foreign policy and beyond.' Its influence in
political science generally is attributable to its theoretical elegance and simplicity. Its
influence on analyses of foreign policy in particular lies in its methodological simplicity:
states are assumed to behave as a rational self-interest maximizing individual would. No
similar pithy formulation exists for the organization theory or governmental politics
models of foreign policy decision-making. Thus no simple model immediately comes to
mind when addressing scenarios where organizational structure and competing interests
among several organizational players are thought to play a role. As facile applications of
rational choice to policymaking have arguably resulted in major policy failures, e.g.
welfare policies aimed at reducing poverty by affecting incentive structures and
philosophies of bank deregulation derived from rational choice reasoning, the lack of a
concise and easily recognizable alternative should be treated as a non-trivial issue by
political analysts and social scientists more generally.
The purpose of this paper is to provide such a pithy model of organizational
behavior by focusing on a few key variables and mechanisms. Many important works of
organization theory have attempted to lay out a general theory of organizational behavior,
especially as applied to large bureaucracies. 2 Many of these works, especially Herbert
Simon's Administrative Behavior, James Q. Wilson's Bureaucracy, and Morton
Halperin's Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, mostly succeed in doing so.
Unfortunately, their theoretical explications span hundreds of pages and introduce several
significant theoretical constructs. Even in Allison's seminal work Essence of Decision,
which aimed at summarizing these varying analytical paradigms, the outline of the
crucial elements of the rational actor model includes just 4 elements, while the outline of
the organizational theory and governmental politics models both span over 30 elements
and independent theoretical constructs. The analyst who wishes to apply their insights is
thus first challenged with deriving from them an easily communicable model and a set of
salient predictions to apply to a specific case. The simple, elegant model of rational
choice requires no such work. I argue that having such a simple, "off-the-shelf"
1Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A
Critique ofApplications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2 e.g. Allison, G. & Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis. 2 nd edition. Pearson Longman.; Wilson, James Q., Bureaucracy, Basic
Books, 1991; Simon, Herbert, Administrative Behavior, The Free Press, Simon and
Schuster Inc, New York, 1997; Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp Bureaucratic
Politics and Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2006.
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conceptualization of organizational behavior would provide significant advantages to the
analyst of political behavior and social behavior in general.3
Despite their sprawling nature, however, all of these classic works of organization
theory tend to ground their analyses in one basic insight: organizations amount to a
shared mental map used to guide their participants' behavior; since this "image" of the
organization must exist in each person's brain to some degree for the organization to
remain functional, some mechanism must be used to coordinate organization members'
images. In bureaucracies made up of a large number of loosely coordinated and semi-
autonomous sub-units, this coordination is often difficult and incomplete, a fact which
leads to many common bureaucratic pathologies. The semi-autonomous nature of these
units itself may generate great heterogeneity in their individual conceptions of the group
image, and necessitate organizational activities to keep their images of organizational
operations coordinated. The model of decision-making presented in this paper thus starts
from this basic premise of "images" and coordination mechanisms. It suggests that many
of the characteristic pathologies of organizational behavior arise from these basic facts.
Its key insight can be boiled down to this: organization members make choices to
maximize their utility, but this utility is thought of in terms of a socially constructed set
of metrics and problem-solving shortcuts- the "image"; the process by which this image
is established reflects the history of the organization, specifically the incentives its
members faced in the past.
To validate the model developed here, I consider a recent major decision in US
foreign policy: the innovation and adoption of the new counter-insurgency (COIN)
doctrine (embodied in the counterinsurgency field manual FM 3-24) in the recent wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. This case is particularly suited to an organizational analysis: it is
difficult for a number of reasons to determine postfacto what an optimal, unitary rational
decision-maker would have done in response to the deteriorating strategic situation in
Iraq. E.g. was the implementation of COIN optimal with respect to the US's broader
geostrategic interests? It is nearly impossible to tell without the benefit of considerable
hindsight. Or, was COIN optimal in terms of creating the best chance of defeating the
insurgency? Reasonable people could fiercely disagree (and have). Was the adoption of
COIN optimal from the point of view of the Army and Marines, who would shoulder the
task of implementing it? Perhaps, though there's equally reason to believe that the Army
and Marines would resist a doctrine that took them so far outside their core competencies.
Lastly, was the decision optimal in terms of the political incentives of the president?
Again, it is difficult to tell. Applying the rational actor model to the decision to adopt
COIN is thus quite difficult. Additionally, the decision amounted a major bureaucratic
shift, dragging the military outside its preferred set of roles and tasks; the decision is thus
assumed to have significant organizational dimensions.
3 Having such a characteristic model of organizational behavior has been a primary goal
of the various strands of the "new institutionalism" in the political science literature.
March and Olsen, 1989, for example, argue that collective action should be adopted by
political scientists as the dominant model of political behavior. March, James G., and
Johan P. Olsen. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics.
New York: Free Press.
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As an alternative to the rational choice model, I consider what a model of
bureaucratic decision-making based on "images" as the basic unit of analysis would say
about the adoption of COIN. To do so, I examine a specific theory of military decision-
making, Colin Jackson's theory of organizational learning dysfunction by modern
militaries in counterinsurgency engagements, in its application to learning in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As my goal is theory building, I first show that his model is basically an
extension to a specific case of the general "image" model of decision-making developed
here, and then examine how well it fit, the evidence: Jackson's theory posits that the
military's characteristic "image" of operations, which he labels the "military operational
code"--a set of deeply held professional beliefs and ways of seeing the world stressing
the one-way application of coercive force as the dominant method for achieving its
goals--inhibits militaries from converging to counterinsurgency "best practices"4 . This is
because these "best practices" do not fit with their characteristic methods for representing
and addressing problems since they cast the problem as one of attaining a political
settlement rather than defeating the enemy. When adaptation to counterinsurgency "best
practices" does occur, it is because either resource scarcity or civilian intervention (a
coordination mechanism) has intervened to spur the military into considering other
options.
Jackson applies this theory to a set of familiar historical cases (e.g. the British in
Malaya and the French in Algeria), finding in all of them a characteristic learning trap:
the military operational code inhibits adaptation by encouraging the military to first
ignore mounting signs of failure since they don't register in the operational code's usual
performance metrics, and then to "exploit" existing alternatives suggested by the
operational code rather than "exploring" for new ones. In applying the model to Iraq, I
find a similar pattern of delayed recognition of failure, and exploitation of more
conventional responses preceding exploration of new counter-insurgency techniques such
as "hearts and minds" operations to win over the population, and violent bargaining
aimed at co-opting the insurgency.' Thus, the dominant image of operations held by
military members, stressing the coercive use of force as the dominant problem-solving
paradigm, inhibits adaptation to alternative images that may violate this basic paradigm.
Reviewing the set of cases in his study, Jackson argues that the pervasiveness of the
"learning trap" pattern across militaries situated in widely differing cultural contexts (e.g.
he also considers the counterinsurgency behavior of the Thai military), differing levels of
counterinsurgency experience, and differing normative and material constraints suggests
that the cognitive biases of the dominant military image play a dispositive role in
determining counterinsurgency strategy choice, outperforming alternative theories based
on experience, culture, or organizational constraints. In this study I present another case
study in support of Jackson's theory, examining various campaigns across the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and attempt to show that the dominant military image has
influenced the course of strategic choice in both of those wars. Part of the evidence in
support of the role of the dominant military image is thus indirect: the forms of
4 This study leaves aside the question of whether population-centric COIN constitutes a
"best practice" or not.
5 These practices were "new" to the US military of 2003-2006; they were in no sense new
in the history of warfare.
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operations chosen are taken as evidence of the types of the thinking the military is
engaging in. The prevalence of certain forms of counterinsurgency operations over others
in this case study, and in the cases Jacksons presents, is taken as evidence of the influence
of the dominant military image. To supplement this indirect argumentation, in the second
section, I also attempt to present direct evidence of military cognitive frames by
reviewing field reports from Afghanistan drawn from the Wikileaks Afghan war logs,
comprised of documents from the US military's SIGACTS or significant activities
database. These reports, representing internal and erstwhile secret military discourse,
should allow us to directly view the dominant military image at work, both in how it
leads to certain conceptions of operations and in how the environment and environmental
feedback is processed.
Jackson's theory presents a specific theory of counterinsurgency innovation:
when alternative approaches are tried, it is most likely the result of disruptions to the
military member's decision-making process emanating from resource constraints, civilian
intervention, or "task pressure" (i.e. the pressures of the operational environment). In
reviewing the evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan, I find limited support for this pattern
of innovation: innovative approaches to the COIN problem, such as Colonel Sean
MacFarland's efforts at tribal mobilization in the oft-cited Anbar "Awakening"
movement resulted from a combination of resource constraints and a long experience of
failure in the region (task pressure). On the other hand, Lt. General David Petreaus's
operations in Mosul at the beginning of the war followed an innovative pattern without
such pressures. I argue that, though these examples don't fit Jackson's theory exactly,
they reflect basic aspects of the organizational theory laid out below: adaptation often
occurs because lower-level unit's guiding images gradually shift due to the differential
effects of the environment on their thinking versus the effects on the organization as a
whole. Additionally, as suggested by some of Jackson's case studies, innovative
commanders such as MacFarland and Petreaus in Iraq, or General Leclerc in French
Indochina or General Gerard Templer in British Malaya, may bring alternative images
into the organization from their wider experiences.
Jackson's theory suggests that, in addition to suggesting sub-optimal solutions to
the counterinsurgency problem, dominant military professional and cognitive biases (the
"image") also lead the military to subsequently purge the lessons learned during
counterinsurgency campaigns after they are over. Eventually, the dominant military
image of operations as the coercive application of force to the enemy will reassert itself,
even if some units temporarily innovate a new approach. The second half of the empirical
section below tests this assertion by examining doctrine documents and field reports from
the war in Afghanistan: following the perceived successes of the "surge" in Iraq, the new
approaches to counterinsurgency doctrine being promoted by General David Petreaus and
others in Iraq became the "new conventional wisdom" in Afghanistan. This
institutionalization of COIN approaches followed on-the-ground innovation in Iraq. If
Jackson's argument about the influence of the military's professional biases is correct, we
should see these new approaches hewing more closely to the dominant coercive paradigm
of the military than to more unconventional approaches to fighting insurgencies, thus
purging the most effective and unconventional innovations from the military's repertoire.
To guide this analysis, I review Jackson's typology of counterinsurgency strategies,
arguing that the most rare form of counterinsurgency strategies, which shifts the problem
7
from one of working with the people to kill the enemy to one of negotiating with the
enemy and affiliated non-state groups to generate a political settlement, was rarely tried
in either campaign. Rather, the COIN revolution basically augmented the military's basic
enemy-focused violent coercive approach with elements aimed at coercing the population
into supporting the effort. It was therefore more a result of military thinking applied to a
different problem rather than a genuinely innovative approach, pointing to the influence
of the military "image" in its processes of adaptation.
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 develops the image-based model of
organizational decision-making (henceforth the "image model") and develops hypotheses
on the process of organizational learning from it. Chapter 2 introduces the Jackson theory
of organizational learning dysfunction and discusses how it fits into the image model.
Chapter 3 applies the model to the case of Iraq. Chapter 4 concludes with a restatement of
the model and a general discussion of its utility and relation to other theories. Before
proceeding to chapter 1, in the next section I briefly clarify the goals of the paper.
A note on models
The goal of this paper is to develop a pithy model of organizational behavior, and
models necessarily ignore certain aspects of the world. Their purpose is to make
meaningful simplifications of broad social dynamics based on realistic assumption that
allow one to isolate mechanisms of interest. They should therefore be fairly simple and fit
to the context of the analysis. One of the oft-criticized tendencies of rational choice
theorists, on the other hand, is that they mistakenly pursue the development of a
deductive theory with universal validity. In doing so, they often overcomplicate their
analyses to save the deductive core of the theory. To quote one critic:
Why has the rational choice approach become so influential in political science
when it illuminates so little about politics? The answer lies in the professional
imperatives political scientists face. Too many of them buy into the misguided
idea that the only way to develop a science of politics (as distinct from journalistic
commentary) is to have a universal deductive theory, and they then turn to
economics in search of it. (The economists turned to physics for the same reason;
I leave it to others to debate the wisdom of that move.)
[.. .]
When rational choice models are specified in ways that make clear, arresting
predictions, they often lead to results that are contradicted by what we know about
politics. [...] Defenders of rational choice respond with endless adaptations of the
meaning of rationality, saving the models at the price of rendering them banal.
6 Ian Shapiro, "A model that pretends to explain everything", New York Times, February
26, 2000, Arts section. http://phoenix.liu.edu/-uroy/eco54/histlist/pol-sci-rational.htm
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On the other hand, the development of deductive theories is considered, by some at least,
to be the distinguishing feature of scientific inquiry. Indeed, the availability of
appropriate, simple deductive theories allow the analyst great leverage in explaining
wide-ranging phenomena. Elegant theories such as rational choice can thus lull the
analyst into a false sense of omniscience if not applied appropriately, just as they can
provide great insight when they are. Modern social science has thus rightly focused on
developing rigorous theories, but has often erred in applying them too readily when they
provide little analytical leverage. The availability of other pithy, off-the-shelf
conceptualizations of human behavior besides rational choice should thus be helpful for
the discipline. The work of Allison and others aimed at just such a formulation of
organizational behavior, but arguably fell short of a pithy and easily communicable set of
analytical propositions. This paper aims at developing one such alternative.
Chapter 1: an image-based model of organizational
decision-making
For the sake of clarity, I first state the theory in toto in the next section. Section 2 unpacks
the various concepts that go into it, citing, where appropriate, the origin of these ideas.
Section 3 presents the theory in outline and uses it to develop a specific model of
instances where organizations must adapt to changing circumstances (i.e. situations
parallel to those analyzed by Jackson with respect to military learning during war).
The model in a nutshell
The model of organizational decision-making developed here can be stated in the
following way: all human choices in the various contexts we face are guided by an
internal mental image. An image tells the person how information from the environment
is to be interpreted and what the person can do and should do in response to its stimuli.
Thus an image is a sort of "program" the human executes continuously that conditions
their perceptions and choices. Organizations are made up of 2 or more people whose
images share certain aspects in common that allow them to coordinate their behavior to
pursue some common goal.' We can refer to this aspect of their images that overlap as the
"organizational image". A person's image changes over time in response to conscious
and unconscious activities of choice, some of which are influenced by the person's
incentive structure (I'll refer to this simply as "image drift"). Thus in order to ensure the
organizational image remains coordinated, the organization must affect individuals so
that their personal images remains coordinated with the organizational image. They do so
7 John Kay, "Economics: Rituals of rigour," Financial Times, n.d.,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/faba8834-cf09- 11 eO-86c5-
00144feabdcO.html#axzzl W6Rql Het.
8 Following Herbert Simon, one can define coordination formally as obtaining whenever
the behavior of one individual is dependent on the behavior of another. Op. cit. Simon, p.
9-10.
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by supplying payoffs that fit the individuals' incentive structures (i.e. they supply
incentives to meet a demand for incentives), a process one may label "authority".
The choices organizations make in general are the result of the organizational
images held by their participants, and thus of the organization's ability to use payoffs to
keep the organizational image coordinated. The organization's decisions vis-i-vis the
outside world are determined by the images of organization members who have authority
over the "operators" by which the organization affects the outside world.
Unpacking the elements:
Images
By images I mean the most basic conception of how humans process information
about their environments: we all possess a psychological "set", a conditioned way of
interpreting information about the world and responding to it. When light beams strike a
cell phone and then strike our eyes, our brains assemble the light beams into an image in
the mind which is then matched to a store of past encountered images that tells us it is a
cell phone, and calls to mind what a cell phone is. The image thus conditions our
perception. It also conditions our response to problems: when someone's walking down
the street and encounters an obstacle, a number of programs for dealing with the obstacle
may be triggered-walk around it, wait for it to pass, complain about it-depending on
the specific type of obstacle encountered. Lastly, the image provides value metrics for
deciding how close we are to achieving the goals of the image: if our work at our
occupation is consistently being rewarded with bonuses, we imagine we're doing a good
job.
One way to think about images is as the full information set necessary for a
human to perform a certain task in a certain environment. In particular, one can think of
an image being composed of goals, methods, and selection rules: goals are predefined
states of the environment to be achieved; methods are things the person can do to achieve
them; selection rules tell the person which methods to choose in response to different
configurations of the environment in order to achieve a goal.
Images and incentives
Our guiding image in a specific context is the result of past learning processes,
either in that context or in a similar one, and its development is guided by our incentive
structures. E.g. we know to avoid touching a hot stove either because someone strongly
encouraged us not to in the past, or we touched one and got burned. In the former case,
we may have had an incentive to listen to the person (e.g. a mom who would scold us if
we didn't). Thus our incentive to follow their authority led to the alteration of our guiding
image with respect to the hot stove. In the latter case, our personal incentive not to feel
pain led to the alteration.
The model developed here sees these two routes to image development-
authority, or personal learning-as the complete set of processes by which images are
developed. I ignore unconscious processes of image development, as well as chemical
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changes etc. (e.g. someone gradually succumbing to Alzheimer's, or who suffered a blow
to the head, is losing their guiding image due to another process entirely).
The organizational image
When we join an organization, we allow part of our personal image to be made up
by an organizational image. We do so, as the model so far suggests, because it serves
some incentive we hold, whether it be to get paid, to build a sense of solidarity with
coworkers, to create a sense of purpose, or some other payoff. Once we become an
organization member, we allow part of our choice processes to be guided by the
organizational image so as to serve the organization's purpose. Thus, we can define
organizations as mental maps-images--shared by 2 or more people and used to
coordinate behavior, where coordination is defined as obtaining whenever one person's
behavior is dependent on another's.9
Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp ground the theory of bureaucratic behavior
they present in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy on images: "When participants
share a set of global images, those images will decisively shape the stand they take on
particular issues.""' They go on to list certain images that dominated government thinking
during the cold war. E.g. "The preeminent feature of international politics is the conflict
between communism and the free world", or "Every nation that falls to communism
increases the power of the communist bloc in its struggle with the free world", and "the
United States has an obligation to aid any people resisting communism at home or
abroad."" Thus, the organizational image can prescribe a way of seeing the world, as in
the first statement, value metrics for analyzing changes in the world, as in the second
statement, or things that the organization should do in response to the environment, as in
the third. These images may or may not be codified in official doctrine and, in fluid
bureaucracies facing quickly changing circumstances, they are less likely to be written
down. Reconstructing them is thus an ethnographic task. As the above examples suggest,
organizational behavior, especially in large organizations, is mostly guided by informal
understandings of this sort.
Consideration of images is especially important in large organizations made up of
semi-autonomous sub-units, i.e. bureaucracies. In such organizations, each sub-unit is a
sub-organization with its own potentially unique image. Coordinating these units' images
so as to achieve the organizational purpose could be difficult.
Coordinating Images: incentive supply and demand
As noted above, images can change either in response to incentives to follow
authority, or due to personal incentives such as the avoidance of pain, the pursuit of
9 Under this definition, most human relationships involve organizations: friends, families,
social networks, businesses, industries, states, nations, political parties, and religions are
all organizations under this definition.
( Op. cit., Clapp and Halperin, 9.
" Ibid. 10-11
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profit, or the desire to pursue reasonable courses of action (I leave aside what factors
motivate personal learning besides general ones such as failure). Over time, if
environmental stimulus is allowed to affect an isolated organization member or sub-unit
so as to alter their guiding image via their personal learning processes, their image may
become discoordinated with the organizational image." Thus, authority structures would
have to supply payoffs that matched their incentives to listen to people with authority in
order to guide their image back to harmony with the organizational image.'" Following
James Q. Wilson's incentive theory of the organizations", we may thus imagine a supply
and demand of incentives: organization members with authority must be able to supply
enough incentives to meet other organization members' demand for incentives to keep
their organizational images well coordinated.
One can imagine a few scenarios where the differential effects of image changes
due to authority versus image changes due to personal motives could lead to various
problems for an organization. E.g. if incentives to follow authority are too high, personal
learning may be discouraged, which could impede the organization from adapting to
circumstances. On the other hand, if personal learning is allowed to dominate, an
organizational sub-unit may begin to pursue goals that are counter-productive to the
organization's broader purposes. The theory presented here also suggests that, under
certain scenarios, organizational images could be coordinated without the exercise of
authority: if everyone finds a particular image reasonable and adopts it on their own, the
organizational image could be coordinated around a new idea without anyone being
"forced" into adopting it by authority mechanisms. On the other hand, it suggests that,
when a new image is opposed by the majority of an organization's members, members
with authority may need a great supply of incentives (negative or positive) to ensure
coordination.
Personal choice:
Images guide choices. How exactly does this happen? Rational choice imagines
an agent with fairly robust mental faculties to consider all the relative values of all the
different possible states of the world and choose the one that maximizes his utility. As
noted by Herbert Simon and others, this is a bad description of human choice. Rather, our
rationality is bounded: we use mental shortcuts and incomplete information to make
decisions. Few people have the time to engage in the exhaustive mental process described
by rational choice. Furthermore, humans' limited attention span means that we essentially
1 E.g. a sub-unit of a business firm that provides customer service may be motivated to
make increasing investments in customer service technology in response to complaints of
slow service; these investments could cause the unit to go over budget, leading more
senior executives to impose more severe constraints on its spending.
13 These acts of incentive distribution by the organization may be overt, such as censure
or penalties levied on the organization member, or more subtle, such as the ongoing
threat of being fired.
" James Q. Wilson and Peter B. Clark, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations,"
Administrative Science Quarterly 6, no. 2 (September 1961): 129-166.
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consider alternatives one at a time. Choice is thus a form of sequential search over a
limited range of alternatives." The notion of "images" constraining choice captures these
basic insights.
In influential work, John Steinbrunner finds that individuals use a set of standard
techniques to deal with uncertainty in the outside world, the most prominent of which is
"use of pat images and argument by analogy": as summarized by Halperin,
Individuals frequently attempt to determine which previous event, either in
international politics or in their own personal experience, most closely relates to
the event at hand, and then they seek to reason by analogy. Thus the impulse to
avoid another Munich played a major role in shaping the reaction of many
government officials to the Vietnam situation.' 6
Thus, instead of a rational process of choice over all alternatives, a particular decision is
framed in terms of some previous decision. Instead of considering the universe of
possibilities, this mental shortcut allows you to consider just one or a few.
While there are other types of shortcuts that Steinbrunner mentions, focusing on
this particular one is the most informative for qualifying organizational behavior: as in
Simon's model of bounded rationality and "satisficing", we chose solutions that we
believe are good enough in a situation based on our understanding of similar events from
the past.7 Our images determine the metrics of value we use. They also condition the
alternatives we consider in the first place. As a result, we often engage in "exploitation"
of known alternative approaches to a problem, rather than engaging in "exploration" for
new ones.8
Organizational Choice
With all the elements of the model in place, it is possible to meaningfully qualify
how organizational choices happen: organizational choices that affect the world outside
the organization through some organizational operator'9 reflect the image of the sub-
group of the organization that has authority over that operator.
1s Emotions and motivations citation
16 op. cit. 21
17 Early critiques of Simon's model ignored this aspect of his theory; Andrew Lo argued
recently that this led a valuable and powerful approach to theorizing decision-making to
be overlooked by social scientists, and to the growing hegemony of rational choice
theories. Lo, A. (2004). "The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis: Market
Efficiency from an Evolutionary Perspective." Journal
of Portfolio Management 30 , 15-29.
18 James G. March, "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning,"
Organization Science, Vol. 2, No. I (February 1991).
' An operator is just any thing that the organization can do to the outside world. I.e. a
government bureaucracy can hold a press conference (an operator to communicate with
journalists); the Pentagon can make decisions affecting force distributions (thus the
ability to affect where military assets are is an operator).
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Thus if a sub-unit of a military has the authority to control which tactics to use,
and their guiding image (built up from their experience and learning processes) tells them
to pursue different tactics than the ones prescribed by the organizational plan, they may
do so. If authority structures catch wind of this and disapprove of the new tactics because
they don't fit their image, they may attempt to distribute negative incentives
(punishments) to coordinate the unit's errant group image (image competition). If, on the
other hand, they like the new tactics (i.e. they appeal to their personal incentives) they
may decide to impose the new image on other units via the distribution of incentives.
Choice is thus determined by images but is constrained by authority.
The model in outline
The preceding section unpacked the models central concepts. In outline, they are:
1. Images: associated patterns of mental response to the outside world that tell the
individual what they are seeing, how to evaluate it, and how to respond to it.
2. Organizational image: that part of a person's image that coordinates their
behavior with other organization members to achieve the organizational purpose.
Organizations are two or more people sharing an image.
3. Incentives:
a. personal incentives lead to the adoption of new images or alterations of
existing ones because the individual derives some utility from the change.
b. Authority: organizational incentives lead the individual to adopt an image
because the individual has some incentive to follow authority structures
4. Incentive supply and demand: the organization's authority structures can attempt
to coordinate members' images with the organizational image via distributions of
payoffs the organization members want (e.g. salaries, promotions, adopting
methods organization members prefer, etc.)
5. Choice: at both the individual level and the organizational level, choices are
determined by the images of those doing the choosing.
20 Following Benedict Anderson, organizations are thus "imagined communities."
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Applying the model to processes of adaptation
The model above presents a general theoretical outline of how organizations
work: images govern choice; images change due to the influence of incentives and the
constraints of the environment; organizational images are coordinated via the distribution
of incentives by authority figures. Figure 1 portrays the basic elements of the model; the
lines represent forces acting on the image of organizational sub-units (a sub-unit may be a
single individual, or some group with routinized authority structures (divisions,
departments, etc.)). The organizational image, in turn, is made up of the images of its
sub-units. The whole system of images is supported and coordinated by the ongoing
distribution of incentives (eg. salaries).
In this section, I apply the model to a specific problem: how organizations deal
with adaptation. Specifically, when an organizational image is not fit to the circumstances
the organization faces, what processes are likely to follow? Adaptation to unfavorable
circumstances seems to describe the process of moving from conventional war
approaches to COIN in Iraq, so the purpose of this section is to develop abstractly a
model of what one should expect to see in this process using the image model of
organizations above.
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First, what does it mean that an organization holds an image that is not fit to the
circumstances? As defined above, images tell you how to interpret what you're seeing,
how to measure it in terms of personal or organizational value or utility, and what
behaviors to choose in response to it." Thus, images tell you what your goal is and how
to achieve it in a given environment. When an image is not matched to the circumstances,
this means that the methods and perceptions it applies to the environment are not suited
to achieving the goal. Either the methods or the goals must change. Adaptation can be
understood as a change in dominant images in response to incoherence between the
dominant image and the environment. It will involve either a change in methods or a
change in goals, or both.
Figure 2:
TO: Image Harmony
21 One way to think about images is suggested by Allan Newell's model of human-
computer interaction: images are made up of goals-what state of the environment to
pursue; methods-mental indices of the various ways available for affecting the
environment (one can call these means "operators"); and selection rules--rules that tell
you what method to choose in response to specific environmental stimuli.
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Figure 2 portrays an organizational adaptation process based on images. At tO, the
organization is in equilibrium: the organizations various sub-units and the individuals
they are composed of share images sufficiently to coordinate their behavior towards the
end of achieving the organization's goals. At tI, the environment interacts with the
incentive structure of an organizational sub-unit so as to gradually draw their guiding
image away from the organizational image. At t2, the sub-unit's image reaches a state of
disconnect from the organizational image. In response, at t3a, the organization may either
attempt to punish or reward the sub-unit in an attempt to induce them to bring their image
(and resulting decisions) back in line with the organizational image; alternatively, t3b, the
organization may choose to adopt the sub-unit's image, either because of outside pressure
or because it provides the organization with some payoff. Many scenarios likely involve
some combination of t3a and t3b. Lastly, at t4, the organization fals back into
equilibrium as the sub-unit's image and the organizational image become coordinated
again.
TO: Equilibrium
Looking at each step more closely, at 10, the figure portrays the sub-unit's image
and the organization's image as overlapping incompletely. A sub-unit could be a single
individual, or a sub-organization within an organization (e.g. a division, a department,
etc.). The figure portrays these images as overlapping only imperfectly: for most
organizational tasks, there are some decisions that organizational operators must make
that are not completely spelled out by the organizational guiding image. E.g. participating
in a soup kitchen may require varying levels of coordination of individual behavior:
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opening cans and cooking soup could be largely self-directed by the individual based on
his prior knowledge of how to do those tasks. On the other hand, the volunteer will have
to accept some level of coordination from the organizers in order to allow the cafeteria
line to run smoothly, and perhaps in interacting with patrons. A military, on the other
hand, may require much more explicit coordination of the individual image of soldiers:
extensive training in highly specialized tasks is required to create the patterns of mental
response necessary to coordinate a military unit. At tO, a military will have generated
much greater overlap between the organizational image and the sub-unit image through a
greater (and perhaps more diverse) provision of incentives than a looser or more short-
term organization like a volunteer soup kitchen.
In equilibrium, the organization thus distributes a stable supply of incentives to
ensure the required level of image coordination. In a business firm these incentives may
take the form of salaries and opportunities to bolster individual reputations. In more
voluntary organizations these may take the form of more ephemeral payoffs such as a
sense of purpose or solidarity.22
TI: Sub-unit learning
In step tl, the differential effects of the environment on an organizational sub-unit
versus the effects of the environment on other organizational units can lead the sub-units
image to gradually drift away from the organizational image. As theorized above, this is a
gradual process of the environment interacting with organizational or personal incentives
and learning processes of the sub-unit to change their guiding image. How gradual this
process proceeds is a function of several factors, including the structure of individual
incentives, the challenges of the environment, the organization's learning routines, and
how extensively the organizational image is specified. E.g. if an organization's image
specifies several contingencies to expect in an uncertain environment, negative feedback
from the environment may first be interpreted in terms of these defined contingencies
instead of being realized as a novel problem to be addressed. Exploitation of existing
routines may thus precede exploration from new ones. On the other hand, personal
incentives such as the desire to avoid failure or personal danger may spur a sub-unit to
ignore organizational routines and codes and engage in exploration earlier on.
Additionally, organizational procedures may allow certain organizational players to
ignore existing rules and norms and engage in exploration themselves if they strongly
desire to do so. Or, organizational codes may specifically guide certain individuals to
engage in exploration, e.g. a research and development department.
In a seminal paper on organizational adaptation, James March differentiates
between exploitation and exploration in organizational learning: exploration involves the
search for new solutions outside the organizational repertoire; exploitation involves the
application, refinement and development of existing organizational routines. March
22 The "incentive theory of the firm" developed by Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson
theorizes three discrete incentive categories that govern organizational behavior: material
incentives, solidary incentives (payoffs related to a sense of solidarity), and purposive
incentives (payoffs related to achieving some purpose). This theory is discussed in
chapter 4.
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observes that organizations face explicit and implicit tradeoffs between these two routes
to adaptation. Focusing on exploration can result in a plethora of underdeveloped ideas
and too little distinctive competence, while organizations focusing on exploitation risk
finding themselves trapped in sub-optimal stable equilibria. Choosing the right balance
between exploration and exploitation is a complicated task. As he summarizes,
"Understanding the choices and improving the balance between exploration and
exploitation are complicated by the fact that returns from the two options vary not only
with respect to their expected values, but also with respect to their variability, their
timing, and their distribution within and beyond the organization."2 3
March goes on to theorize that the "mutual learning" embodied in the
organization's codes and procedures may affect the balance between exploitation and
exploration: organizational procedures, norms, routines, etc. both constrain individual
behavior, but also accumulate the knowledge generated by individual learning. In the
present study, I refer to the entire complex of recorded patterned responses of the
organization as the organization's "image", which thus comprise norms, routines,
procedures, etc.-any guiding information contained in the organizations' memory. The
image both governs the choices of the individuals in the organization, but is also
contributed to by the organization's members. March summarizes the inherent learning
tradeoff succinctly: "The gains to individuals from rapidly adapting to the code [the
image] (which is consistently closer to reality than the average individual) are offset by
second-order losses stemming from the fact that the code can learn only from individuals
that deviate from it."" Learning organizations must thus both constrain individual
learning in order that knowledge be disseminated properly, but also encourage individual
learning so that knowledge can be generated. Different organizations will adopt different
mixes of exploration and exploitation based on their incentive structures and
environmental pressures.
As Barry Posen and others have theorized, the intense operating environment of
militaries in wartime means that they will likely favor exploitation over exploration. As
Posen writes, militaries develop extensive standard operating procedures to deal with the
high uncertainty of the battlefield. We should thus expect the process of "image drift" in
tI to be slow in militaries. Business firms, on the other hand, will likely have to come to a
more specific balance between exploitation and exploration, depending on the type of
business they do: a high-technology firm derives its profits from constant exploration,
while a large retailer may gain the most from creating efficiencies in its existing supply
chain.
T2: image incoherence
At t2, the challenges of the organizational operator's environment combined with
an ill-suited image lead the sub-units image to drift away from the organization's image.
E.g. a store in a convenience store chain faces a persistent burglary problem, in response
to which the store manager decides to close early, violating company policy. His personal
incentive to remain safe overwhelmed his organizational incentive to comply with the
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franchise policy on store hours. Or, US bomber pilots in Japan in WWII are ordered to fly
low, subjecting them to anti-aircraft fire, leading them to avoid engaging their targets."
Their fears for their personal safety led them to not follow the organization's prescribed
behaviors.
T3: organizational resistance or adaptation
Image incoherence may potentially last a while, depending on how vigilantly sub-
units are monitored by other organizational decision-makers. Once the incoherence is
recognized, however, if this incoherence threatens the incentive supply of other
organization members, they will attempt to correct it in order to defend their own image,
t3a. To do so, they can supply positive or negative incentives to the sub-unit in order to
induce them to bring their image back into harmony with the organizational image. In the
examples above, the convenience store franchise may threaten to fire the store manager if
he does not restore its night hours. If the store manager fears being fired more than being
robbed, he may comply. In the WWII example, according to Robert McNamara, General
Curtis LeMay told his airmen that he would be in first plane and that any pilot who didn't
go over the target would be court-martialed; the desertion rate dropped immediately.
On the other hand, as suggested by March, the deviations of the sub-unit from the
organizational image may potentially constitute a useful adaptation in terms of achieving
the organization's goals, t3b. If this is recognized by other members of the organization
with decision-making authority, they may choose to adopt the deviant image as part of
the organizational image instead of rejecting. As theorized above, this change in images
will happen if the new adaptation provides some payoff to the organization. In highly
routinized organizations such as militaries, t3b may be more unlikely than t3a, and may
require some outside prodding for organization members to realize that a sub-unit's new
image constitutes a useful adaptation. This is portrayed in t3b as "outside pressures". In
business firms, these could be profit motives or pressures from customers that lead
decision-makers to realize that a sub-unit's new image could contribute to profitability.
For militaries, this outside pressure may come from civilian authorities or political
pressure from the population.
In most scenarios, organizational learning will reflect some combination of t3a
and t3b, representing the basic push and pull between organizational conformity and
individual learning suggested by March.
T4: image harmony
At the last step of the adaptation process, the sub-unit's deviant image is either
adopted, rejected, or some combination of the two occurs. The organization returns to
equilibrium as a new pattern of stable incentive supply is established to coordinate the
organization around the new, altered image. It should be noted that this return to
25 This anecdote is related by Robert McNamara in Errol Morris's film "The Fog of War"
Errol Morris, The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara,
Documentary, 2003.
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equilibrium may take a long time, or may not occur at all (another option is that the sub-
unit or organization as a whole simply terminate).
This section developed a specific process model of organizational adaptation from
the image model of organizations laid out above. In the next two chapters I examine how
well the model describes the process of adaptation to counter-insurgency in Iraq. I do so
by first showing in the next chapter how Colin Jackson's model of organizational
learning dysfunction is basically an expression of the image-based model developed here.
Reference to his model will help fill in the blanks that must be supplied to deploy the
theory on Iraq and Afghanistan, namely, "what was the dominant image?", and "what
was the alternative image?"
Chapter 2: Colin Jackson's model of organizational
learning dysfunction
Militaries share certain features in common with other bureaucracies: they are
populated by semi-autonomous sub-units habituated to executing certain fixed routines.
Their activities are coordinated through a combination of formal and informal rules,
procedures, and conventions-from written doctrine all the way to informal cultural
practices. Thus while Colin Jackson's theory aims at explaining a specific phenomenon
of military behavior-learning failure in counterinsurgency -it should reflect more
g i Ifres o organizat1ons. Thic crtion precntc Ialcn's thenry and
discusses its relationship to the image model. It also discusses the nature of the dominant
image in Jackson's theory, the "military operational code", and its effect on which
counterinsurgency strategies are chosen; it also presents Jackson's typology of
counterinsurgency strategies, i.e. possible alternative images.
Colin Jackson's theory of military organizational learning dysfunction in
counterinsurgency
Jackson posits that a specific image-the "military operational code" (MOC)-
inhibits adaptation to effective counterinsurgency practices. The MOC is a set of
professional beliefs held by military professionals that ensure effective prosecution of
conventional war.2 1 It is thus a dominant guiding image that has developed as a result of
the incentives present in the military's most common forms of engagements throughout
history.
As Jackson notes, the MOC image both conditions responses to environmental
stimuli, and prescribes value metrics in evaluating the results of the responses chosen.
Since the MOC includes not only a standard prescription but also a set of
performance indicators, it focuses the leadership's attention on the results of the
military operations. Since the counterinsurgency forces are generally far stronger
26 Jacksons, Colin, Defeat in Victory: Organizational Learning Dysfunction in
Counterinsurgency, unpublished manuscript, April 16, 2008.
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and better equipped than the rebels, almost all military engagements will end in
counterinsurgency victories. The string of 'small victories' masks the underlying
lack of progress towards the desired political objective.
As theorized in the process model of adaptation above, the dominant MOC image is
predicted to inhibit identification of failure ("image incoherence").
The MOC image also prescribes responses to failure, leading to "exploitation" of
existing solutions before "exploration" for new ones:
Even when the gap between local successes and campaign results becomes
clear, the first response will be to exploit existing solutions - to refine existing
routines and escalate the scale and intensity of the military effort. In this sense,
the MOC sets up a "learning trap" in which positive military performance delays
the search for more effective and more political strategies.28
Beyond the MOC, bureaucratic preferences also encourage the military to
abandon the lessons learned during counterinsurgency campaigns once they are over.
Bureaucratic preferences, like the oft-theorized tendencies to maximize autonomy,
resources, and prestige, can be seen as a result of the image-formation process: a
organizational sub-unit develops its characteristic pattern of behavior-the guiding
image--through an iterative process of individual learning amongst its members as to how
to perform the task, and through a process of responding to the demands of organizational
authority structures for the outputs they are assigned to produce. Sub-units are thus
naturally invested in their image. They seek autonomy and resources to protect and
sustain it, and they seek prestige because they view their image as integral to achieving
the goals of the organizational image.93
27 Ibid. 14
28 ibid. 14
29 this aspect of images is discussed at length by Halperin and Clapp, 2006. Processes of
organizational change may thus amount to battles over which sub-unit's image most
determines the dominant image. For example, in discussing processes of organizational
change, they comment "It also happens on occasion that a few audacious participants tire
of framing every argument in terms of some well-worn orthodoxy. Certain officials
conclude that they can get the decisions they want from the government by changing the
set of images by which the government operates. If they feel that they have built up
sufficient credibility as reputable and reasonable participants in the policy process, they
may launch a deliberate effort to change others' perception of reality." P. 161
3 This is an important theoretical point on its own: the classic bureaucratic preferences
for autonomy, resources, and prestige is theorized to arise from processes that equally
affect smaller organizations. An important question in organization science is what
conditions lead organizations to seek expansion? More often than not, bureaucratic
entities seek expansion to ensure a stable supply of incentives: e.g. Halperin theorizes
that bureaucratic sub-units seek financial resources in order to have a ready supply of
incentives to supply to subordinates (e.g. promotions and raises) to coordinate behavior.
These preferences can thus be understood through the simple concept of incentive supply
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Bureaucratic preferences discourage adaptation to effective counterinsurgency
practices because they threaten the military's autonomy, resources and prestige: it
threatens their autonomy and prestige by elevating the achievement of political objectives
like achieving a political settlement with insurgents over military objectives like killing
the enemy. These goals assumedly bring civilian leaders and civilian approaches to
problems to the fore. Involvement in politics also generally threatens military prestige.
The desire for resources affects adaptation to counterinsurgency because conventional
operations usually entail higher expenditures on hardware. Thus a conventional strategy
will demand more resources than an unconventional one, which could potentially raise
their level of priority in the budgeting process. Additionally, although adoption of
counterinsurgency practices may entail more resources (e.g. more troops in the "surge"),
the military will typically not be able to channel these resources into its preferred areas -
i.e. capital expenditures in capabilities related to conventional war. Lastly, the sheer
availability of resources may lead militaries to stick to conventional approaches just
because they can.
The other element in Jackson's theory is task pressure, which acts as a "switching
mechanism" between the two sets of biases: when task pressure is high, during war, and
especially during high-intensity situations like domestic insurgency, the cognitive biases
of the MOC dominate in affecting the pattern of learning. When task pressure is low, e.g.
during peacetime or during expeditionary counterinsurgencies, bureaucratic preferences
will tend to dominate.
Jackson's theory thus theorizes variation in the dependent variable, strategy
choice, as arising from variation in three independent variables: the professional beliefs
of the MOC, bureaucratic preferences, and task pressure. When the dominant pattern of
learning dysfunction is overcome, it is because of two factors affecting two of these
independent variables: civilian intervention into strategy-making can spur the military to
overcome the biases of the MOC, stimulating search for more novel solutions. Likewise,
resource scarcity can affect bureaucratic preferences: when resources are abundant, the
search for new methods will be dominated by conventional responses since these types of
operations are generally capital intensive. On the other hand, resource scarcity can
encourage the military to search for novel solutions to the counterinsurgency problem
earlier on.
Relation of the Jackson model to the image model
Jackson's model provides a succinct, mechanical explanation of the process of
adaptation to counterinsurgency, but one that fits various cases across many time periods
quite well:" when faced with counterinsurgency, militaries first exhaust their repertoire
of conventional solutions as dictated by the MOC before moving on to try other solutions
such as political war. In certain cases, however, some factors may intervene to spur
exploration of new solutions before conventional solutions have been exhausted,
allowing the military to break out of the MOC-induced "learning trap". Both of these
and demand: bureaucracies seek to expand to increase their supply of incentives, and seek
autonomy to ensure their stable use.
31 E.g. Algeria, Vietnam, British Malaya, etc.
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factors amount to effects on military decision-makers incentive structures: resource
scarcity means the potential returns to conventional solutions are much lower since the
resources to support them are not present; additionally, civilian intervention can serve to
incentivize military leaders to pursue unconventional solutions early on.
Figure 3:
TO: Beginning of Campaign
26
T1: MOC exploitation and failure
Environmental
Stimuli, i.e. task
pressure
Resource
Constraints
T2: Image incoherence
27
T3a: organizational resistance to COIN
Authority/
*Organizational
incentives
T3b: Civilian Intervention
Civilian
Intervention
Learning
processes
28
T4: Institutionalizing COIN/Forgetting COIN after the
campaign
Authority/
Organizational
incentives
Jackson's theory can be placed in the framework of the image model above, as
portrayed in figure 3. At tO, at the beginning of the campaign, the image of ground units
and the organization as a whole are harmonized around the dominant image, the military
operational code. At ti, as the MOC prescribes ill-suited solutions to the counter-
insurgency problem, the sub-unit's image of operations may gradually drift away from
the MOC due to the influence of negative environmental feedback, i.e. "task pressure" in
Jackson's formulation. Likewise, factors such as resource scarcity can lead the sub-unit to
converge to a new image more quickly by eii conventional options. These two
factors interact with the incentives of the sub-unit to cause their image to drift away from
the MOC and towards unconventional COIN solutions, t2.
At t3, as Jackson theorizes, the military at large rejects the solutions being
generated on the ground because of bureaucratic biases and the cognitive biases of the
MOC, t3a. Players within the military attempt to resist the new image by distributing
organizational incentives to correct the errant images. On the other hand, civilian pressure
may intervene to push the military away from the Military Operational Code and towards
unconventional COIN solutions, t3b.
Lastly, at t4, Jacksons theorizes that, after COIN campaigns end, the bureaucratic
preferences of the military will tend to return to the fore, leading it to forget the lessons of
COIN. Thus, at t4, the military supplies incentives and exercises authority so as to reject
the COIN image and restore the Military Operational Code. Below, I examine this stage
of the adaptation process in reference to war in Afghanistan, arguing that the
institutionalization step in t4 attempted to codify the new approaches to COIN by placing
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them squarely within the military's dominant coercive paradigm; thus COIN, innovation
occurred, but was constrained by the military's dominant image.
As shown in figure 3, Jackson's model thus follows the general organizational
adaptation process laid out above: the environment affects sub-units so as to gradually
drag their image away from the organizational image, the MOC. This process may be
spurred by environmental pressures or resource constraints. In response, the organization
either resists the new sub-unit image by supplying positive or negative (most likely
negative) incentives to the unit. Alternately, they may chose to adopt the sub-unit image
due to civilian pressure.
As Jackson emphasizes throughout is study, the process from tO to t1 may be
quite gradual as the exploitation of conventional solutions is likely to precede exploration
for new ones. This is because the highly-routinized and structured nature of military
behavior favors exploitation over exploration. Thus, special factors such as resource
scarcity or civilian pressures are assumed to intervene to spur innovation when
innovation does occur. Additionally, Jackson emphasizes that specific innovative
individuals such as French General Leclerc in Indochina or General Gerard Templer in
British Malaya may bring their own deviant images to the process and thus encourage
unconventional solutions that contravene the MOC earlier on.
The Military Operational Code
In applying Jackson's model to Iraq, it will be helpful to clarify what we would
expect to see as far as the MOC affecting strategic choices. This section briefly addresses
what the MOC is, and how it might affect choice of counterinsurgency strategies.
Jackson notes that the dominant feature of the MOC is a focus on coercion:
military problems are generally viewed as one of applying force to compel submission by
the enemy. Jackson identifies three dominant assumptions of the MOC image:
First, the model is predicated on a simple and stable information structure in
which the enemy army is the focus and all other objects in the battle space are
secondary. Second, it assumes that problem solving depends on the one-way
application of force to compel submission. It assumes that the physical destruction
of the enemy's armed forces will lead enemy leaders to capitulate. Third, the -
model minimizes the role of the local population. The central issue is the clash of
armies and civilians are treated as insignificant and largely passive bystanders."
Barry Posen likewise identifies several broad tendencies in military behavior that
encourage offensive doctrines: e.g. militaries prefer to address standard scenarios to
reduce operational uncertainty, and deny opponents their standard scenario. Offensive
doctrines allow this. Offensive doctrines also increase militaries' autonomy and resources
by emphasizing their core competencies of violent coercion.33
Jackson and Posen note that the military mindset, which generally encourages
32 ibid. 50
" Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1984) 47-49.
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conventional, offensive approaches to military conflict, arises largely from the desire to
reduce operational uncertainty through the use of standard operating procedures. Another
way to put this, in terms of the image model, is stability of incentive supply:
organizations will prefer to pursue courses of action that allow stable payoffs to their
incentives. Thus images, and the standard operating procedures (or choice rules) they
prescribe, develop to ensure a stable supply of incentives, i.e. high certainty about the
environment and operations' effects on it, and the payoffs it supplies. Images therefore
have inertia of their own. The dominant military image favors the solution of problems
through the application of organized military force, so even scenarios that require a
broader set of tasks and problem solving approaches will tend to be viewed in those
terms.
Types of counterinsurgency strategies
In order to theorize the affect of the dominant image, the MOC, on strategy
development during counterinsurgency engagements, the DV, Jackson develops a
typology of possible counterinsurgency strategies: Model 1, the dominant response,
entails a conventional approach to counterinsurgency: counterinsurgency is essentially a
"small war", with the enemy and the process of defeating him analogous to that of a
conventional engagement: the enemy is distinct from the population, and can be defeated
solely through the application of military force. Model I is the MOC in action.
Militaries occasionally evolve to an approach that incorporates political
considerations into the conventional model of warfare, Model 2. Under this strategy, the
military views the problem of counterinsurgency as the application of carrots and sticks
to various parties in society-the insurgents, the government, and the local population.
The problem is still viewed as the one-way coercive application of resources to the target,
but the resources are expanded to include positive inducements to resisting the
insurgency, such as construction of roads and schools, in addition to negative military
force, and the target is both the insurgents and unaffiliated parties."
Even more rarely, militaries evolve to seeing the problem as one of violent
negotiation rather than coercion, Model 3. This approach, which constitutes a supposed
"best practice" of counterinsurgency in Jackson's analysis, shifts the emphasis from the
application of coercive force to achieve victory to one of negotiating a political
settlement with the insurgents and the population. It thus breaks the military's dominant
problem solving paradigm:
Models I and 2 assume that the counterinsurgency forces can dictate outcomes
through the exercise of coercive force against rebels and the population. By
contrast, Model 3 assumes that the counterinsurgency forces have limited agency
and that the population is an actor rather than a target. According to this
reasoning, counterinsurgency forces can impose coercive control, but cannot
3 One can thus see COIN in terms of the image model: the goal is to supply incentives so
as to generate legitimacy for a new organizational image, the state.
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construct a lasting political order without the consent of the governed.35
Model 3 approaches fall outside the dominant military image of operations: rather than
attempting to coerce certain parties into accepting a new political order dictated by the
military and allied entities, the problem is seen as one of crafting a political order in
concert with various parties in society.
In the following chapter on Iraq, I argue that the practices adopted as part of the
"surge" entailed Model 2 and, in some cases, Model 3 approaches. Thus, in some
instances, the military did break out of the characteristic "learning trap". The question
then becomes whether their adaptation resulted from the factors theorized by Jackson:
civilian intervention and/or resource scarcity. I find that civilian intervention surely
played a role in ensuring that innovations spread quickly once they were discovered, as in
t3b in figure 3. Many of the innovations initially happened, on the other hand, due to
military learning quite apart from any civilian pressure. Rather, new images resulted from
a combination of resource constraints and the existence of specific innovative
commanders with previous grounding in COIN theory. While this does not fit Jackson's
explicit model completely, his empirical analysis of various cases often attributes
innovation to a combination of resource constraints and innovative commanders such as
General Leclerc in French Indochina. The example of Colonel MacFarland's operations
in Ramadi is a largely similar story of an under-resourced but innovative commander
crafting a unique campaign for the circumstances. On the other hand, General Petreaus's
innovative Mosul operations seemed to arise not from any civilian intervention or
resource constraint, but rather due to ideas he had formed prior to being deployed; as
Jackson's theory would suggest, they therefore largely fall into the Model 2 rather than
Model 3 category.
Additionally, I argue that, when adaptations to COIN did take place, they were
dominated by Model 2 approaches, as Jackson's model would suggest. This was
especially evident in the drafting of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24 and
the resulting institutionalization of certain COIN tactics and approaches. The sequence of
adaptation and institutionalization of COIN approaches followed that suggested in t4
above: the most notable early adaptations such as Colonel MacFarland's in Anbar
province fit a classic Model 3 approach; however, as these adaptations were
institutionalized, they were placed in a Model 2 mold, essentially applying the MOC to
unconventional war and reaffirming the military's cognitive and bureaucratic biases.
Aside from doctrine, I also attempt to show some Model 2 thinking at work as evidenced
in field reports obtained from the Wikileaks Afghanistan war logs. The "new
conventional wisdom" of COIN in Iraq was subsequently applied to Afghanistan,
providing a good testing ground for how the new image was applied (t4). The evidence
for Model 2 thinking is found mainly in how the operations are conceptualized and how
the results of operations are interpreted: as theorized above, the dominant coercive image
of military operations, stressing concrete metrics of operational effectiveness, leads
officers to apply simple, non-social metrics to the problem of gauging operational
effectiveness, even in explicitly political operations such as tribal outreach or
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reconstruction efforts. I argue that, in the end, the MOC determined the military's
approach to the counterinsurgency problem by placing it squarely within the military's
dominant coercive approach to problems.
Chapter 3: Applying the image model to Iraq
If Colin Jackson's model is generally correct and appropriate to apply to the Iraq
case, we should expect to see military cognitive biases-the MOC-and bureaucratic
preferences obstructing the adoption of Model 2 and Model 3-type COIN practices.
These are defined as any "population-centric" tactics that mainly aim at attaining political
rather than military effects, e.g. engagement with tribal leaders, reconstruction aid used as
a carrot to secure buy-in to the political system, "hearts and minds" psychological
operations, basing units among the population, bargaining with the insurgents, etc.. We
should furthermore expect to see patterns of exploitation of known conventional solutions
in response to the growing insurgency, rather than exploration for new tactics and
strategies. Lastly, when adaptation to new strategies does happen, it should be the result
either of civilian pressure, resource scarcity, or a combination of the two.
While Jackson's story does a good job of explaining initial strategic choices and
the response to strategic failure in Iraq, evidence for the last of these points-the role of
civilian intervention and resource scarcity in spurring adaptation-is mixed. Rather, I
find that adaptation significantly preceded civilian intervention into strategy-making in
Iraq, and that it was not necessarily the result of resource scarcity. Rather, tactical and
strategic innovations arose from an iterativeprcs of exploitation and exploration for
new tactics by ground units; additionally, certain units led by commanders with strong
personal views of COIN operations (i.e. their own guiding images apart from the
organizational image) contributed significantly to identifying and testing new approaches.
Civilian intervention did play a role, however, in securing the blessing of authority
structures for this new approach to the war once it was identified.
Although Jackson's model does not fit the evidence completely, I argue that the
general view that the military's dominant image-the military operational code-largely
determines their processes of organizational learning during war, as suggested by the
general image model, is borne out: although COIN cast the military in unfamiliar roles as
political negotiators, social workers, and diplomats, these innovations sprung essentially
from a desire to adopt offensive doctrines, as suggested by Posen: the initial strategy shift
in 2006 revolved around a debate over whether forces should retreat to bases outside
major population centers and in an effort to lower the US footprint and pave the way for
an Iraqi-led political settlement. This was a defensive posture. As Ricks comments, the
innovations in 2006-2007 recast US forces in an offensive role, pushing them out
amongst the population and allowing them to take the fight to the enemy. Rather than
passively waiting for a political settlement to be negotiated by Iraqis, the military shifted
to aggressively trying to create the conditions for one to occur. COIN tactics thus arose
from the MOC, not in spite of it. This reflects Posen's general hypotheses about the
doctrinal preferences of militaries (and bolsters the notion that organization theory-type
factors explain the decision to adopt COIN).
This movement is also evident in one of the most oft-cited example of COIN
success in Iraq, Colonel Sean MacFarland's Ramadi operations: Colonel MacFarland
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pursued genuine Model 3 solutions, seeking to directly arm tribal militias and negotiate
with them on pursuing a political settlement to defeat the insurgents; even here, however,
this shift in operations can mainly be seen as an attempt to create the conditions to apply
military force to kill the enemy:
Additionally, although the shift to COIN tactics did involve a new conception of
the primary problem of the war, casting it from one of defeating the insurgents to one of
inducing parties into accepting a stable political settlement, they more often than not fell
into Model 2 rather than Model 3 approaches. That is, the tactics adopted as part of the
shift towards COIN essentially retained the dominant military approach to problems as
that of a one-way applications of (positive or negative) incentives to the target with the
hope of restoring state authority, with the target expanding to include the local population
and government in addition to the insurgents. They thus often fell short of the Model 3
"ideal" of viewing the problem as one of violent negotiation with the insurgents over
attaining a new political settlement. As Jackson notes, moving from Model 2 to Model 3
involves recognizing "the limits of one-way politics in restoring low cost, state
authority"36; the shift to Model 3 in Anbar was likely facilitated by the absence of state
authority in the area and the prevalence of tribal power, as well as a lack of sufficient
manpower to execute population-centric COIN, rather than any innovative shift in
military thinking. In order to validate this point, I briefly argue that other cases of COIN
engagement following the shift in official strategy of 2007 show that the move to Model
3 is doubtful: the dominant emphasis of strategy is expanding and legitimizing existing
state authority, rather than the forging of a new political settlement through violent
negotiation with the insurgents. 7 This Model 2 emphasis is evident in the structure of
these engagements, in relevant doctrine documents such as FM 3-24, and also in field
reports drawn from the Wikileaks leak.
Thus the dominant MOC image played the dispositive role in determining
strategic choices that the image model and Jackson's model suggests: COIN was less the
result of externally directed disruptions to the military's incentive structure such as
civilian intervention, as in the Jackson model, and more the result of an internal process
of evolution in the Army and Marine's guiding image developed in response to failure.
Summary of predictions for Iraq:
Below, I test three hypotheses about Iraq and Afghanistan. First, as the MOC
image determines both the form of operations and the interpretation of feedback, a long
period of exploitation of conventional Model I solutions is expected to precede
adaptation to Model 2 or Model 3 approaches, the "learning trap". As noted in the theory
section above, an image is defined as encapsulating information necessary to recognize
36 op.cit. Jackson 12.
37 though recent evidence suggests halting efforts towards Model 3 adaptation. "In
Afghanistan's Panjshir, disquiet over Taliban reconciliation I Reuters", n.d.,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/08/us-afghanistan-massoud-
idUSTRE7872A920110908.
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what one is seeing, judge it in terms of the organization's value metrics, and what
behaviors to choose in response to it.
HI: the military will fall into a learning trap as conventional solutions are first
exhausted before unconventional solutions are tried.
Jackson traces out the effect of the MOC image by observing the military
repeatedly applying known alternative conventional solutions in response to failure
instead of developing unconventional solutions. This should be evident in its application
to performance metrics as well as in its strategic adaptations.
Second, Jacksons proposes that adaptations to Model 2 and Model 3 approaches
may be the result of a combination of resource constraints and/or civilian intervention. To
test this point, I focus in on two different tactical engagements, those in Anbar and
Mosul. In both cases, unconventional solutions were experimented with fairly early on in
the war, and significantly, before the "surge" orders that institutionalized the COIN
approach of FM 3-24. The question then becomes what spurred these innovations. If
Jackson's model is correct, some combination of resource constraints and/or civilian
intervention should be evident in the adaptation.
H2: unconventional campaigns resulted from the influence of resource constraints
and/or civilian intervention on military decision-makers.
The story of the surge has been well-told elsewhere, and clearly involves a
significant element of civilian intervention by figures such as retired General Jack Keane
and an assortment of intellectuals and policymakers.3 ' This aspect of Jackson's model is
clearly borne out by these accounts, so I leave it aside in the present study, choosing
instead to focus on innovations early in the Iraq war. These provide a better test of
Jackson's theory of the drivers of tactical and strategic development by military units.
Lastly, I turn to the war in Afghanistan to see what type of COIN strategy was
eventually institutionalized within Army and Marines (t4). If Jackson's story is correct,
we should expect to see Model 2 rather than Model 3 solutions dominating, as these fit
more closely into the military's dominant coercive mindset.
H3: due to the influence of the MOC, the institutionalizing of COIN practices
should proceed in a Model 2 rather than Model 3 mode.
Aside from these three hypotheses, I look to validate the process model laid out in
figures 2 and 3 above: we should expect to see explicit stages of image incoherence and
organizational resistance to new images along the way.
Turning to the evidence:
38 see Woodward, Bob, The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008,
Simon and Schuster, 2009.
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The US military clearly adopted new tactics in late 2006-2007, most notably in
establishing small combat bases close to and within population centers to provide for
better population security, and through increased efforts to work with tribal leaders to
provide security and identify insurgents.394 04 ' These innovations were blessed as the new
approach in Iraq through the elevation to command in Iraq of General David Petreaus, a
consistent proponent of the new approach. Additionally, in announcing the new strategy
in Iraq in January 2007, President Bush remarked that "It is clear that we need to change
our strategy in Iraq," and that its purpose was "to help Iraqis clear and secure
neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi
forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs." 2 A shift to a
new strategic image thus clearly took place in Iraq. The question then is whether it
followed the hypothesized process.
Below I present evidence related to validating the hypotheses laid out above. Iraq
is a vast and complex case; commanders had significant leeway in crafting their
campaign plans, encouraged in part by the lack of an overall strategic plan at the top
levels of decision-making. As a result, Iraq exhibits significant variation in the varieties
of COIN tactics employed. As Austin Long notes in a review of COIN doctrine and
COIN practice in 2003-2006, "The military used an array of approaches ranging from
firepower-intensive raids to population security. This variation seems to have depended
partly on understandable differences, such as the region and time period, but mostly
appears to be due to different commanders.'" 3 Jackson likewise acknowledges that
militaries will often contain individuals with strong Model 3 orientations who may
occasionally break out of the tendencies of the dominant MOC image. The point of his
model rather is to theorize broad tendencies in military behavior owing to the influence of
the dominant image. Accordingly, the presentation of evidence below on the
hypothesized adaptation processes is necessarily selective. My goal is to validate
inductively the view that organizational images play a strong determinative role on
organizational choices overall and thus deserve theoretical attention in their own right.
The evidence from Iraq strongly fits Jackson's model: the MOC initially led to a
dysfunctional learning cycle whereby conventional Model I approaches were
39 Thomas Ricks, The Gamble (London: Penguin Books, 2010) 165. Whether these new
tactics were the primary cause of the reductions in violence 2006-2009, however, does
remain controversial.
40 Also see "Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The US Military and Counterinsurgency
Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006", by Austin Long, Rand Counterinsurgency Study,
Paper 6, page 26.
4' Interview with Major General Richard C. Zilmer, January 1, 2007, by Lieutenant
Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler, reported in "Anbar Awakening, Volume 1, American
Perspectives, US Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009", Edited by Chief
Warrant Officer-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler,
Marine Corpse University Press, Quantico Virginia, 2009.
42 Quoted in Ricks, p. 122
43 Austin Long, "Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence," The US military and
Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006. RAND Counterinsurgency
Study, Paper 6.
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successively tried and failed. Additionally, recognition of failure at the organizational
level was indeed impeded by the application of inappropriate conventional performance
metrics, and by general resistance from organizational players with a strong MOC
mindset.
Where Jackson's model falls short, at least in a superficial analysis, is in
theorizing why the military began to adopt Model 2 and, in some select cases, Model 3
strategies: innovation to Model 2 and, in some cases, Model 3 approaches significantly
preceded the adoption of the COIN philosophy at the organizational level, as evidenced
by their adoption prior to the publication of the field manual or the strategy review that
preceded the "surge". Their early adoption was therefore not the result of civilian
intervention or, explicitly, of resource scarcity. Rather, innovations resulted from an often
resource intensive bottom-up learning process. In short, commanders simply innovated
on their own in response to the demands of the operating environment. A more subtle
point that shows the power of Jackson's theory, however, is that these innovations were
mostly of the Model 2 variety; that is, they retained the military's dominant problem
solving paradigm of applying coercive force, albeit using both positive and negative
incentives. When Model 3 approaches aimed at forging political coalitions were tried,
they were the result not of doctrinal or strategic changes, or civilian intervention, but of
specific circumstances faced by the commanders, as a regional analysis of strategy
variation shows: only in Anbar were genuine Model 3 strategies approached, and this was
largely owing to the dynamics of tribal power already operative in the area, though some
evidence exists that resource scarcity in the form of insufficient manpower also played a
role, as in Jackson's theory. Jackson's broader point about the influence of the dominant
MOC image on the search for strategic responses is thus borne out.
In the following case study, I largely ignore the role of General Petreaus and the
COINdinistas on the adoption of COIN strategy in the military more widely. This is a
well-told story and clearly illustrates the role of civilian, or at any rate outside
intervention into the policy-making process in encouraging the adoption of
unconventional strategies, in line with Jackson's theory (one of the primary interveners in
the policy process was retired General Jack Keane, a civilian of a sort).4 4 I focus instead
on the tactical shifts that occurred early on in the war in response to active search for new
images by lower-level units: this focus should provide the most leverage in examining the
effects of the dominant MOC image on decision-making, and the role of "image drift" in
response to changing incentive structures in spurring bottom-up innovation. Specifically,
I contrast the Model 3 approach of Colonel Sean MacFarland in Ramadi and the Model 2
approach of General Petreaus in Mosul in the first phase of the war (before he became
overall commander).
44 James Russell notes that Petreaus's role was mainly in blessing innovations already
under way. This had the effect of bolstering the COIN competencies of new units
entering the field, but the origin of these tactics traces to unit-level innovations. James
Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar
and Ninewa Provinces, 2005-2007 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011)
3. As Ricks also notes, General Odierno drew directly from these early innovations in
crafting the COIN strategy that was eventually adopted more broadly. (op.cit. Ricks 72-
80).
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Initial strategic responses: applying the MOC
Jackson's model suggests militaries will first pursue conventional solutions in
response to insurgencies. These Model 1 solutions view the problem of
counterinsurgency as essentially that of a small conventional war: the objective is to kill
or capture the enemy, and achieving it involves the one-way application of military force.
Additionally, as HI suggests, evidence that this strategy is failing to achieve the objective
should at first be ignored or reasoned away due to the application of inappropriate Model
1 performance metrics, and due to bureaucratic frictions arising from resistance from
bureaucratic decision-makers.
As Long notes45 , tactical approaches in the early phase of the war, from 2003-
2005, were highly variable, ranging from conventional firepower-intensive cordon-and-
search type operations to efforts at population security. This variability was likely
exacerbated by a lack of clear strategic guidance from high-level decision-makers.4 6
Nevertheless, the military did exhibit a clear tendency towards Model I approaches.
Perhaps the clearest evidence of this can be found in the fact that COIN doctrine
emphasizing unconventional approaches did exist in 2003-2005, and yet the majority of
operations stressed a conventional approach. For example, Long notes that FM 3-07,
"Stability Operations", explicitly addressed the strategic peculiarities of
counterinsurgency: "Stability operations and support operations demand greater attention
to civil considerations-the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an area of
operations (AO)--than do the more conventional offensive and defensive operations";
and, that "Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater
popular support. The winner will be the party that better forms the issues, mobilizes
groups and forces around them, and develops programs that solve problems of relative
deprivation."47 Furthermore, FMI 3-07.22, an interim field manual on
"Counterinsurgency Operations", was published in October 2004 in response to a lack of
clear doctrinal guidance for COIN, and emphasized a similar population-centric view of
the COIN problem.
Despite these sources of strategic guidance, the majority of forces in Iraq initially
pursued conventional solutions and framed the problem in conventional ways. 48 Initial
tactical approaches were dominated by cordon-and-sweep operations and targeted raids
aimed at directly weeding out the insurgents from the population.4 95 05 ' Early strategic
45 Ibid.
46 Ricks, 195
47 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability and Support Operations,
February 2003, p. 2-15. Quoted in Long, ibid.
48 op.cit. Ricks, 15-30.
Eric Schmitt, "AFTER THE WAR: STRATEGY; G.I.'s Shift to More Precise, Smaller
Raids - New York Times," New York Times, September 2, 2003, sec. World,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/02/world/after-the-war-strategy-gi-s-shift-to-more-
precise-smaller-raids.html?src=pm.
50 Long notes two notable examples, Operation Kennesaw Dragon, in Ad Dawr on
November 14, 2005, and Operation Clean Sweep, in Southern Baghdad on the same day,
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guidance from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the ground commander in late 2003, to the
extent that it was forthcoming, amounted to advice to pursue a "presence mission" that
stressed intelligence collection:5 ongoing patrols and cordon-and-sweep operations
would drive intelligence collection aimed at identifying and isolating the insurgents.53
E.g. A Red Cross report on operations in the Sunni triangle in 2003-2004 under Colonel
David Hogg summarizes:
Arresting authorities entered houses usually after dark, breaking down doors,
waking up residents roughly, yelling orders, forcing family members into one
room under military guard while searching the rest of the house and further
breaking doors, cabinets and other property. They arrested suspects, tyin their
hands in the back with flexicuffs, hooding them, and taking them away.
Cordon and sweep operations were likewise the hallmarks of operations by the 4 h
Infantry Division in the Sunni triangle under General Odierno5 5 and the 82"d Airborne
under Maj. General Charles Swannack, which detained thirty-eight hundred people from
August 2003 to March 2004.56 These tactics thus showed a disregard for the responses of
the neutral population and likely fueled some decisions to aid the insurgency. They thus
represented classic Model 1 responses: the problem was killing or capturing the enemy,
and the population was simply a neutral terrain on which that battle was to be fought.
Thus, despite clear doctrinal guidance to observe the classic tenets of COIN-e.g.
protect the population, nurture them as a source of intelligence-the general biases of the
MOC image dictated that operations generally fell into Model 1 patterns, as Jackson's
model would suggest. The MOC was thus a strong determinant of COIN practices, even
in the face of established operating procedures for COIN. Operations were not framed in
terms of political war, as history and doctrine would prescribe, but rather in terms of the
military's dominant coercion paradigm.
It is important to note that there were exceptions to this pattern, notably in the
operations of David Petreaus's 101s Airborne Division in Mosul. In the case of Petreaus
and, for example, of Colonel H.R. McMaster's operations in Tall Afar, this variation
likely resulted from alternative images possessed by these commanders: both Petreaus
and McMaster spent considerable time studying alternative COIN tactics and strategies
while pursuing academic degrees. 57
both of which involved cordoning the towns and extensive attacks, including air assaults
in Kennesaw Dragon. Op. cit. Long
51 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco (London: Penguin, 2007) 194.
52 Ricks, Fiasco, 192
5 Fiasco, 194
4 quoted in Ricks, Fiasco, 235
ss Fiasco, 224. Ricks notes that Odierno made a remarkable philosophical shift towards
classic COIN practices, becoming a sort of unsung hero of the surge. (citation needed)
5 Fiasco, 224
57 Ricks, The Gamble, 72.
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Delayed Recognition of Image Incoherence
Jackson writes of a syndrome in counterinsurgency in which a series of small
tactical victories fuels the illusion that conventional operations are meeting with strategic
success, in line with H L" This syndrome was clearly in evidence in the early debates
over the course of strategy from late 2003 through 2006. For example, division
commanders Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack of the 82n airborne division and Lt. General
Raymond Odierno of the 4th Infantry Division both pursued firepower intensive, cordon-
and-sweep type operations early on in the war, and largely concluded that their operations
were effective, at least at first.59 61 When problems were identified with the large-scale
operations in North Baghdad that alienated local populations, the response of Generals
Sanchez and Abizaid in late 2003 was to switch to more surgical raids that nevertheless
aimed at directly isolating and capturing the insurgents.6 ' More generally, results from
kinetic operations early in the war were often misinterpreted as generating the requisite
depletion in insurgent capability for victory.62
More generally, the debate that grew from 2003 onwards over how to respond to
the deteriorating situation in Iraq generally featured the military resisting diagnoses of the
problem that would lead to more unconventional strategy prescriptions, as HI would
suggest: General Casey, who took over command of Iraq in June 2004, attempted to
develop approaches that drew upon the lessons of previous COIN operations and
scholarship, even opening a counter-insurgency academy in 2005.63 Nevertheless, the
strategy that grew out of this thinking essentially violated many of the classic tenets of
COIN: as Ricks summarizes, Casey's strategy amounted to withdrawing to large bases
outside of major population centers (so-called super-FOBs), speeding up transition to
Iraqi security forces and allowing Iraqi forces to handle fighting inside cities." Thus,
58 Op.Cit. Jackson, 1-3.
59 Ricks, Fiasco, 232, 319. Odiemo, for example, commented in 2004 that "The former
regime elements we have been combating have been brought to their knees" and that the
insurgency was "a fractured, sporadic threat, with the leadership destabilized, finances
interdicted, and no hope of the Batthists' return to power," 263.
60 Thomas E. Ricks, "Dissension Grows In Senior Ranks On War Strategy
(washingtonpost.com)," Washington Post, May 9, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A 11227-2004May8.html.
Swannack, for his part, recognized that the early approach in Iraq was succeeding
tactically but probably failing strategically.
61 "AFTER THE WAR: STRATEGY; G.I.'s Shift to More Precise, Smaller Raids", n.d.,
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/02/world/after-the-war-strategy-gi-s-shift-to-more-
precise-smaller-raids.html?pagewanted=3&src=pm.
62 E.g. Ricks, 405, notes that, despite pockets of opposition, the second battle of Falluja, a
large conventional operation, was widely viewed as a success and a template for
operations to come.
63 Fiasco, 12
64 The Gamble, 111. See also David E. Sanger, Michael R. Gordon, and John F. Burns,
"Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush Team Says - New York Times," New York Times,
January 2, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02war.html.
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Casey's COIN thinking amounted to abdicating any role in a political war. US forces
were viewed as an irritant and impediment to the crafting of an Iraqi-led political
settlement. US forces would thus continue to hunt down insurgents in Model 1 style,
while leaving any attempt to craft a political settlement, as Model 3 would prescribe, to
Iraqis.
Military decision-makers thus chose courses of action that would maximize their
returns in terms of the dominant image-i.e. through success in performance of routine
conventional operations -and allow them to avoid activities that didn't conform to the
MOC's performance metrics, i.e. activities resembling political war.
Exploitation versus Exploration
Various evidence thus exists that the dominant MOC image delayed recognition
of failure in Iraq from 2003-2006, in line with HI. Jackson's model also suggests that,
when adjustments to strategy were attempted in response to failure, they would likely
first exploit existing conventional solutions rather than exploring for new ones.
The best evidence for HI is Casey's approach prior to the rise of the General
Odierno and Petreaus's new COIN strategy. Casey eventually landed on a strategy of
retreating to large bases outside of major population centers in order to focus on training
Iraqi forces, and of engaging in what David Killcullen called "kiss of death" operations:
selective raids of suspected insurgent hold-outs without any consistent follow-on
presence in the area.65 The overall military search process thus remained constrained to
conventional solutions, eschewing the broader adoption of unconventional tactical
approaches being developed concurrently by some units (e.g. enhanced efforts at tribal
outreach and basing of troops amidst the population in order to develop more police-type
local security services)." The military overall thus initially avoided exploring for a new,
more unconventional approach to counter-insurgency operations, despite considerable
innovation from lower-level units, preferring instead to stick to conventional, coercive
approaches.
The determinants of innovation: H2
Despite the overall conventional mindset evident in Casey's strategic responses,
considerable innovation occurred in tactical approaches throughout 2003-2006. Then, in
late 2006-2007, the new approach coalesced in the publication of the new
counterinsurgency field manual FM 3-24, the result of a wide-ranging search process
both within and outside the military, and was imposed upon the military through the
blessing of President Bush's "surge" orders. Thus, the full cycle of adaptation in figures 2
and 3 took place, from initial image incoherence stemming from on-the-ground learning,
tO-t2, to the effect of civilian intervention in pushing the military's image of operations
towards unconventional warfare, t3b. In terms of Jackson's model, the question then
65 Ricks, The Gamble, 51.
66 E.g. Ricks, The Gamble 72-80 and Russell, chapter 4, highlight the innovative efforts
of Colonel Sean MacFarland and the ls' Brigade Combat Team, Is' Armored Division.
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becomes whether this innovation was the result of his hypothesized variables -civilian
intervention and/or resource constraints, H2.
Evidence on this aspect of H2 is mixed: civilian intervention into strategy-making
clearly played a role in ensuring that the new approach to COIN developed by Petreaus
and others was adopted more broadly in the Army and Marines.67 On the other hand, one
crucial piece of evidence suggests Jackson's model does not entirely explain the tactical
and strategic innovations undertaken in Iraq: a large number of the battlefield innovations
and general innovations in strategic approach occurred before the surge and before the
publication of FM 3-24, significantly preceding the official shifts in policy directed by
General Odierno and implemented by Petreaus. These innovations thus arose not because
of civilian intervention, or (arguably) due to resource constraints, but rather due to the
innovative thinking of their individual commanders. The image model theorizes two
routes to image change: distribution of organizational incentives aimed at altering
images, or shifts due to the personal learning processes of the sub-unit (i.e. responses to
personal incentives) (i.e. being burned by the stove or being told not to touch it). Several
units responded to failure by engaging in the latter process, e.g. those under the command
of General Petreaus, Lt. Colonel H.R. McMaster, and Colonel Sean MacFarland. As the
process in figure 2 depicts, this "image drift" was often aided by a lack of specific
direction from authority structures (i.e. a lack of distribution of corrective organizational
incentives).
To test H2, I will consider below two specific cases of COIN innovation
occurring in the earlier phases of the war: Colonel Sean MacFarland's Ramadi operations
with the 1" Brigade Combat Team, 14 Armored Division (the 1/1) and Major General
Petreaus's operations in Mosul with the 10Is' Airborne Division. MacFarland's efforts in
Ramadi conform to a Model 3 approach, while Petreaus's fit a Model 2 approach.
Additionally, while both commanders brought to their tasks considerable creativity and
original thinking, they faced quite different circumstances. Ramadi is the capitol of Al
Anbar province, a largely rural and sparsely populated region of Iraq where tribal power
largely determines local politics."8 Mosul, on the other hand, is the third largest city in
Iraq with considerably more formal government infrastructure."
Colonel MacFarland in Ramadi: Model 3 experiments
67 The story of the "surge" told in accounts such as Thomas Ricks "The Gamble" explain
it largely in terms of the rise of a group of policy insurgents within the military, with a
crucial assist from retired General Jack Keane and some other civilian thinkers, i.e
civilian intervention of a sort. Bob Woodward's trilogy of books on the wars places the
emphasis on changes in thinking within the administration, again suggesting that civilian
intervention played a role.
68 Clary, John, "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives", The Washington
Quarterly, January 2009.
69 "The Accidental Statesman: General Petreaus and the City of Mosul", Kennedy School
of Government Case Study C 15-06-1834.0.
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Colonel Sean MacFarland arrived in Ramadi in June of 2006 after four months
spent relieving McMaster's 3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. This experience would prove
crucial in generating a basis for an alternative image of operations: MacFarland's
operations have been widely noted for developing several tactical innovations that
amounted to a meaningful strategic shift towards genuine COIN operations: MacFarland
significantly developed TTPs on the construction of small combat outposts (COPs)
located among the population. These outposts were jointly manned with Iraqis and
allowed coalition forces to maintain a consistent presence in cleared areas in order to
project stability and empower locals to report on insurgent movements. Resource-
intensive tactics such as these suggest that Jackson's hypothesis about the role of
resource constraints in encouraging Model 2 and Model 3 responses is not supported:
many of the tactical innovations of COIN were resource intensive, such as COP
construction and beefed up intelligence systems. 0
MacFarland also increased efforts to build ties with the local tribal leadership,
building on operations by the previous unit in the area aimed at building a local police
force. Crucially, MacFarland broke with official policy in giving police jobs to local
tribal militia members and allowing them to only operate in their own neighborhoods.7
MacFarland also allowed tribes to retain control of their lucrative smuggling trade and
offered them a hand in reconstruction projects. MacFarland also dared to directly fund
tribal militias MacFarland's effort thus had a strategic component, aiming to co-opt tribal
power and political processes in place rather than focusing on bolstering the legitimacy of
the Iraqi government. They thus conformed to a Model 3 strategy in Jackson's typology:
rather than attempting to get the neutral population to support the central government,
MacFarland's approach focused on negotiating a settlement with erstwhile hostile tribal
sheikhs .72
As Russell notes, MacFarland faced resistance from his commanders to the latter
efforts to co-opt the tribes (organizational resistance, t3a), as they broke with the official
policy of supporting the Iraqi government, though he eventually won the argument with
his superiors.7" Russell generally notes that MacFarland, and many of the other units he
observed engaging in meaningful tactical innovations, did so because they were granted
leeway from their commanders to do so, in line with the process portrayed in figure 3: the
lack of direct exercise of authority over MacFarland's sub-unit's guiding images in the
form of distribution of incentives from his superiors (t3a) allowed his guiding image to
"drift" far away from what was prescribed by military doctrine.
While MacFarland's operations were often resource intensive in terms of
material, the resource constraints aspect of Jackson's model may be borne out in one
70 One may argue that the primary resource constraint to focus on was manpower: a
reasonable conjecture, for example, is that a lack of adequate manpower led to some of
the strategic choices such as the retreat to larger bases. It is difficult to argue, however,
that the US military was significantly lacking in any material resource.
71 Jim Michaels, "An Army colonel's gamble pays off in Iraq - USATODAY.com," USA
Today (Friedberg, Germany, May 1, 2007), sec. World,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-coloneln.htm.
72 op.cit. Russell, 114.
73 Op.cit. Michaels.
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respect at least: forces in Al Anbar province were clearly insufficient to running the type
of fully-resourced population-centric counterinsurgency effort later prescribed by FM 3-
24. Prior to the innovations in tribal relations undertaken by MacFarland, military
commanders had concluded that Anbar had largely been "lost" and that military forces
were not capable of defeating the insurgency.7 4 It was in this environment that
MacFarland and the Marine commander Brig. Gen. John Allen began to court the
sheikhs. Thus, as in Jackson's model, resource constraints may partly explain the military
innovations of the Anbar Awakening.
Petreaus in Mosul: Model 2 operations
Then Maj. Gen. David Petreaus's 10 1" Airborne Division's operations in Mosul
are another example of bottom-up innovation preceding any civilian intervention into
strategy-making. Taking advantage of a lack of specific strategic guidance flowing from
commanding General Sanchez", Petreaus's operations in Mosul presented a clear
contrast with the early approaches of other invasion units: Petreaus moved quickly to
establish a consistent security presence in the city, and also moved to quickly restore
basic services and civil administration. Petreaus eschewed the large-scale cordon-and-
sweep approach, instead advising his soldiers to exercise high levels of discretion and
courtesy in operations aimed at isolating insurgents.76 He also innovated the practice of
using coalition funds to buy off local elites and build support for the occupation. 7 7
Drawing on his academic background studying counterinsurgency operations,
Petreaus clearly conceived of his task as one of political war, and he was allowed to
enshrine his general approach in the counterinsurgency field manual. Two aspects of his
operations in Mosul, elections and reconstruction efforts, suggest that his approach erred
closer to a Model 2 than a Model 3 approach. That is, Petreaus's operations tended to
emphasize the development of a legitimate government, but his route to doing so was not
through attempts at co-opting local power structures and processes, as in MacFarland's
tribal outreach efforts, but rather in attempting to generate processes of democratic
governance out of whole cloth. Reconstruction efforts and other civil-military operations
thus stressed generating support and legitimacy for the government being developed
through military efforts rather than in crafting a political settlement based on the local
balance of power.
First, Petreaus was notable for moving before any other unit towards holding local
elections. Petreaus sought to capitalize upon the window of opportunity created by the
initial invasion, during which his forces were essentially "omnipotent", to move towards
creating a political settlement.7 " To do so, Petreaus himself acted as the ultimate arbiter of
political legitimacy, personally vetting the candidate's lists and establishing the
procedures of the election. As Petreaus remarked, "The election was all about trying to
74 op. cit. McCary
75 Ricks, Fiasco, 227-228.
76 Ricks, Fiasco, 231.
77 "The Accidental Statesman: General Petreaus and the City of Mosul", Kennedy School
of Government Case Study C15-06-1834.0
78 ibid.
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ensure representation as fairly as we could of all the different tribes, districts, interest
groups, political parties, and ethnic groups."79 Thus, in the absence of any legitimate
power center, Petreaus attempted a Model 3 approach of crafting a political settlement
out of many competing interest groups. Nevertheless, he pursued a maximal approach in
which US forces stood as the final arbiter of political legitimacy, essentially preserving a
Model 2 view that a political settlement could be achieved through the exercise of
coercive force. This strategy presents a clear contrast with MacFarland's attempts at co-
optation of tribal power. This general Model 2 emphasis is also evident in Petreaus's
approach to reconstruction: facing a vacuum of civil authority, Petreaus took the tack of
assigning a civil affairs officer to every ministry, thus granting occupation forces total
oversight over the reconstruction and state-building process. 0
The examples of operations under MacFarland and Petreaus all illustrate that
innovations towards Model 2 and Model 3 approaches were tried before the significant
intervention of civilians into strategy-making, or due to resource constraints (indeed,
many of these operations were resource intensive), though lack of manpower may have
played a role in MacFarland's Ramadi operations."' In each case, as the process model
suggests in figure 2, t3a/t3b, this lower-level "image drift" by these commanders was
facilitated by a lack of specific strategic direction from above: Petreaus benefitted from
commanding General Sanchez's lack of strategic guidance and his general granting of a
free hand to lower level commanders; MacFarland was likewise given considerable
leeway by his superiors12 . H2 is thus only partially supported in the case of Iraq: rather
than civilian intervention driving initial innovations, the story is one of a authority
vacuum encouraging innovation by creative ground commanders, innovation that was
eventually built upon to change the strategic course of the war in general. Thus, incentive
processes at a personal rather than organizational level prevailed: each of these
commanders drew on their intellectual grounding in COIN to craft different approaches.
Subsequent to these initial innovations, the process portrayed in figure 2 and 3,
t3b, clearly took place in the process that led to the "surge" orders. As portrayed in
accounts by Bob Woodward and Thomas Ricks, a group of policy entrepreneurs led by
retired General Jack Keane and supported by administration figures were able to work
with military leaders like General Petreaus and, crucially, General Raymond Odierno, to
institutionalize the COIN innovations of Petreaus, MacFarland and others in the form of
new doctrinal guidance in FM 3-24. The Jackson model would suggest that these
innovations would most likely fall into a Model 2 rather than Model 3 approach, as
Model 2 retains the military's dominant coercive approach to solving problems, H3. In
the next section, I turn to primary source evidence from doctrine documents and field
reports from the war in Afghanistan to test H3.
79 ibid. 12
80 ibid. 25
81 James Russell reports several other examples of bottom-up COIN innovations
preceding the official strategy shifts of "the surge" in "Innovation, Transformation and
War", ibid.
82 Ricks, The Gamble, 63.
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Slouching towards empire: choosing Model 2 over Model 3
approaches, H3
As suggested above, these initial efforts at COIN innovation in Iraq fell into both
Model 2 and Model 3 categories. Jackson's model suggests that, to the extent that
innovations to non-Model 1 approaches are tried, they will more often not fall into the
Model 2 category, which retains the military's dominant coercive problem solving
approach, H3. The contrast between Petreaus and MacFarland's operations noted above
suggests this aspect of his theory is borne out, highlighting the power of the dominant
MOC image. To be sure, part of the contrast between MacFarland and Petreaus's
operations is owing to the fact that willing tribal structures existed for MacFarland to co-
opt in the more isolated region of Anbar, while Petreaus had to deal with a more diverse
polity. 3 Nevertheless, Petreaus's approach and the approach of the Anbar "Awakening"
presented two distinct theories of victory: in Model 2, COIN is political war in which
victory is achieved by incentivizing the population to reject the insurgency and support a
government already in place (the "Host Nation" or HN in the language of FM 3-24).
Under Model 3, COIN is violent negotiation with hostile forces in which attempts are
made to co-opt aspects of the insurgency into the government, or at least into a stable
local political order.
In this section, I consider evidence on H3 from doctrine documents and from field
reports from Afghanistan. If H3 is correct, we should see Model 2 approaches dominating
these sources rather than Model 3 approaches. The difference between Model 2 and
Model 3 approaches in doctrine should be evident in the theory of victory they contain:
under Model 2, the insurgency is defeated by inducing the neutral population to reject the
insurgents and support the legitimate governing authority. Under Model 3, the emphasis
is instead on using violent negotiation with insurgents or other non-state organizations
that may support them so as to craft a political settlement.
With respect to the field reports from Afghanistan, the difference between Model
2 and Model 3 should be evident from the military's treatment of the tribes. Under Model
2, one would expect to see tribal relations mainly aimed at generating support for the
central government. Under Model 3, one should expect to see operations aimed at
directly mobilizing the tribes to provide security and governance. In addition to the form
of operations, images also prescribe performance metrics as theorized above. We should
therefore also see assessments of the results of operations falling into either Model 2 or
Model 3 patterns. Under Model 2, for example, unconventional operations such as
83 Indeed, Lindsay and Petersen (2011) argue that US forces may have needed to lose
before they won in Anbar, as Sunni groups were only willing to "flip" to supporting US
forces after they had been effectively countered by outside insurgent group. E.g. Long
(ibid.) notes that "As late as November 2006, Marine intelligence painted a grim picture
of al-Anbar despite the doctrinally sound efforts in places like Al Qaim and Ramadi.114
However, many tribes were in the process of splitting from Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and
realigning with the United States (and to a lesser extent the central government of Iraq).
While the United States proved flexible in exploiting some of these fractures, U.S.
successes occurred independently of doctrinal change." John Lindsay and Roger
Petersen, "Iraq Case Study for the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups".
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reconstruction projects and other efforts to change "hearts and minds" should be assessed
in terms of their ability to generate support for the central government. Under Model 3,
on the other hand, political operations should be evaluated in terms of their ability to
empower tribal governance in order to reject the insurgency.
The next section elaborates further on the differences between Model 2 and
Model 3 approaches by reviewing evidence on variation in strategic approaches in Iraq.
The following section considers evidence on H3 from doctrine documents, and the last
section considers evidence from field reports from Afghanistan. I consider evidence from
Afghanistan following the strategic shifts in Iraq because they allow one to consider how
the newly formed organizational image surrounding COIN capabilities was
institutionalized: As Lindsay and Petersen (2011) note, COIN became the "new
conventional wisdom" in Afghanistan following the perceived successes of the surge. If
Jacksons's theory of the influence of the dominant military image of operations as violent
coercion is correct, we should see the new COIN image as replicating the dominant
coercive approach to problem solving in the unconventional context of COIN.
Model 2 versus Model 3 in Iraq
In this section, in order to clarify the difference between Model 2 and Model 3
approaches before turning to the primary source evidence reviewed below, I review
evidence on strategic variation in Iraq. Jackson's model suggests that, to the degree that
COIN became institutionalized within the military over the course of the war, one would
expect a Model 2 versus Model 3 conceptualization to prevail: as Posen's theory of
military doctrine suggests, militaries seek doctrines that attempt to deny the enemy their
standard scenarios, and dislike doctrines that rely on breaking the political power and will
of the enemy since they are not accustomed to gauging it (e.g. deterrent strategies). They
generally prefer to see war as a coercive battle aimed at breaking the military will of the
adversary. Thus, they should dislike Model 3 approaches that rely upon gauging and co-
opting various sources of political power in a society in order to craft a political
settlement, and possibly involve negotiating a settlement with the enemy; this view of
war places the emphasis on achieving conciliation rather than capitulation and thus
breaks out of the coercive mindset of the MOC. It also potentially grants violent agency
to erstwhile enemies, which surely does not help deny the enemy their standard scenario.
Lindsay and Petersen (2011) report the results of a regional study of variation in
counterinsurgency strategies. They argue that several COIN strategies are in evidence in
Iraq, from the population-centric, hearts and minds approach of FM 3-24, to "tribal
mobilization", to assassination of leaders ("decapitation"), to ethnic homogenization of
neighborhoods. Each of these strategies engaged various levels of US military capability,
e.g. the Special Forces mainly pursued a decapitation strategy, while ethnic
homogenization of neighborhoods largely took place without coalition prodding. On the
other two, Lindsay and Petersen draw a clear contrast between the tribal mobilization
strategy pursued largely in Anbar province with the FM 3-24 inspired clear, hold, and
build approach pursued in Baghdad and elsewhere: while both strategies aim at the
establishment of stable and legitimate local governance, tribal mobilization strategies aim
to do so primarily through the cooptation of existing local power structures and political
processes, and thus to craft a local political settlement; FM 3-24, clear-hold-and-build
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strategies, on the other hand, aim at bolstering the legitimacy of the central government
through motivating buy-in. Thus, tribal mobilization strategies largely ignore the
"neutral" portion of the population unaffiliated with either the insurgents or the
government, viewing the operational landscape more as one populated by competing
interest groups and political power structures. FM 3-24, on the other hand, imagines
COIN as a "triangular contest" between counterinsurgent forces, the insurgency, and a
local population who may potentially ally with the counterinsurgent by informing on the
insurgency:
FM 3-24 assumes that popular grievances cause small radicalized groups to take
up arms against the government, and thus that the restoration of government
legitimacy should redress these grievances. It represents the war as a triangular
contest between government security forces and coalition partners (+3), "a neutral
or passive majority" of the population (-1 to +1), and irreconcilable insurgents (-
3). Proactive community resistance (-2) and government aligned local militias
(+2) are ignored or lumped into the other categories.84
In their analysis, FM 3-24 thus presents a clear Model 2 epistemology: the
population is treated as a target for the distribution of positive and negative incentives in
order to encourage them to support the government (-1 to +1) and inform on the
insurgents (-3) who are targeted by military force alone. Thus, the military attempts to
coerce and induce the population via reconstruction and other positive goods and to
coerce the insurgents via force. Tribal mobilization, on the other hand, presents a Model
3 logic: rather than lumping all insurgent forces together, tribal mobilization attempts to
craft a settlement out of erstwhile hostile forces. The insurgents are thus not solely
targeted by coercive force, but are rather selectively engaged. Tribal mobilization thus
rejects the Model 2 epistemology of political war and substitutes one of violent
negotiation aimed at stability: "Whereas FM 3-24 assumes that the solution to civil war
anarchy is a Weberian monopoly on violence invested in the state, the tribal mobilization
strategy gives rise to a stable truce among an oligopoly of feudal warlords".85
Although considerable variation exists in the approaches taken by units in the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (where FM 3-24 became the "new conventional wisdom"
following the perceived successes of Iraq"), evidence suggests that COIN efforts more
often than not fall into Model 2 versus Model 3 approaches, as Jackson's theory and the
image model more generally predict (H3). Lindsay and Petersen (2011) suggest, for
example, that Anbar was one of the few places where a genuine Model 3 strategy was
tried, while Model 2 FM 3-24 and Model I SOF decapitation strategies prevailed
elsewhere in Iraq.87 As noted earlier, Colonel MacFarland's attempt to arm the local
power elite, an explicit Model 3 strategy, met resistance from his superiors due to its
84 Lindsay and Petersen Case Study, 22
85 ibid. 2486
86 ibid. See also, Gian Gentile, "A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the
Army," Parameters, no. 2009 (n.d.).
87 Ibid. 30
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break with official policy to support the central government (t3a)." His attempts at
arming and co-opting local elites and militias into the local police force can be clearly
contrasted with attempts to build a police force in Mosul, which featured centralized
training of recruits at the Hamam al Alil training center in Southern Mosul, and drew
recruits mainly from ill-prepared neutral civilians."
The new COIN doctrine: Model 2 institutionalized
Evidence that Model 2 approaches prevailed following the surge as COIN
capabilities became institutionalized is evident in FM 3-24, the new counterinsurgency
doctrine promulgated in late 2006 after an extensive (and unorthodox) drafting effort led
by General Petreaus."0 To the extent that doctrine guides actual operations, the language
of FM 3-24 heavily suggests that Model 2 approaches to COIN dominate military
thinking. For example, the manual conceives the main problem of counterinsurgency as
one of bolstering the legitimacy of an existing government. For example, section 1-2
states that "insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or
other political authority while increasing insurgent control." Likewise, 1-4 states that
"Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs
and consenting to the government's rule."" More generally, the manual views foreign-
incumbent counterinsurgencies as a problem of bolstering "host nation" legitimacy
(chapter 6 is entitled "Developing Host-Nation Security Forces") in order to dry up
support for the insurgency92 . FM 3-24 thus stresses a view of COIN as political war
aimed at generating support for an existing government (Model 2), not the crafting of a
new political order out of disparate interest groups (Model 3).
As introductions to the public version of the field manual make clear, the
philosophy of COIN contained in FM 3-24 draws heavily on British colonial practices 93 .
It is thus unsurprising that, in its emphasis on Model 2, it seems to recreate a quasi-
imperial notion that the invasion force and the "host nation" it supports possesses a de
facto monopoly on political power; COIN is simply an attempt to get locals to recognize
this inherent legitimacy. Model 3 conceptualizations, on the other hand, would view
invasion forces as a facilitator and selective intervener in local politics, moving to craft
political settlements by selectively supporting and opposing various competing interest
groups; political legitimacy arises from crafting a settlement amongst various groups that
optimizes stability and access to political power. Model 2 approaches thus seem to
contravene America's self-image as a non-colonial power. This suggests that the
incentive structures of military professionals, which generate preferences for coercive
approaches to war, exhibit a strong influence on counterinsurgency strategies chosen: as
88 op. cit. Russell, 114.
89 op.cit. Russell, 154.
90 Ricks, The Gamble, 95,
9' "FM 3-24, US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual," University
of Chicago Press, 2007, p. 2.
92 E.g. 1-147
9 ibid. xxiv
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Posen theorizes, militaries should seek to avoid strategies that require non-military
metrics and non-military capabilities. Thus, despite the field manual's emphasis on
understanding and responding to local grievances, its prescription is to treat these as an
undifferentiated variable to respond to: grievances are to be addressed so that the local
population can be incentivized to support the government. The manual thus retains a
coercive, rather than cooperative, approach to generating political legitimacy.
Distribution of positive incentives such as roads, schools, and other reconstruction
projects to induce the local population to support the government is just the flip side of
applying bullets to the bodies of the enemy to induce their capitulation to the
government.
Thus, despite its unconventional character, COIN as envisioned in FM 3-24
remains an offensive doctrine: it seeks to achieve its objective through a pro-active
application of military power, albeit non-kinetic power in many cases. Its rise within the
US military is thus likely attributable not to factors encouraging the rejection of the
MOC, but due to the MOC itself. Indeed, COINs broad adoption during the "surge" came
at a time when General Casey was encouraging a defensive retreat to large bases outside
major population centers, recasting forces in an offensive posture dispersed amidst the
population. Jackson's model of military decision-making is thus broadly borne out: the
MOC's coercive emphasis played a dispositive role both in conditioning a sub-optimal
initial Model I response, but also in encouraging Model 2 responses as a pro-active,
offensive reaction to strategic failure. While Model 3 solutions were tried, this was more
due to a response to regional exigencies (e.g. tribal receptivity to cutting deals in Anbar)
and the contributions of specific creative commanders such as Colonel MacFarland than
any doctrinal shift. Rather, coercive, Model 2 type strategies became the institutionally
preferred solution as enshrined in FM 3-24.
Evidence from the field:
This section considers evidence on H3 from field reports from the War in
Afghanistan. If Model 2 approaches dominate, we should expect to see evidence of this in
the evaluative criteria applied to after-action reports from unconventional operations such
as reconstruction efforts and tribal outreach. These efforts should be evaluated mainly in
terms of their affects on inducing the neutral or loosely affiliated population (-1, 0, +1) to
support the government, rather than in terms of coercing or empowering local non-state
or even insurgent groups into supporting a political or security settlement. Model 3
thinking, on the other hand, should be seen in attempts to directly empower tribes and
other non-state political groups (the +2, +3, -2, and -3's, rather than the -1 , 0, and +1 's).
Examples of Model 3 operations are those attempting to directly empower or arm tribes,
or to engage in political reconciliation with insurgents. Model 2 engagements should
instead aim to empower the central government (+3) and engage the neutral population (-
1,0,+1).
The data considered here is drawn from the Wikileaks "Afghan War Logs"
document dump. The Afghan War Logs constitute over 75,000 field reports drawn from
the US military's SIGACTS or significant activities database, covering the period from
January 2004 to December 2009. The documents cover a range of operations, from
reconstruction efforts to raids on insurgent positions to injury reports, etc.. The process
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that generated the sampling of documents represented in the document dump remains
unknown, so it is difficult to assess how much coverage of the universe of field reports
the Logs represents.
The following analysis is based on a review of the 113 documents in the Logs that
contain the key string "tribal leader"." This search was utilized to pick up any reference
in the Logs to efforts to engage tribal leaders (or "tribal leadership", which would also be
picked up by the search) since this evidence would provide the starkest test of whether
Model 2 or Model 3 approaches were being tried with respect to these most crucial non-
state political groups in Afghan society." It is interesting to note that this key-string
search does not turn up any matches until late in 2006 around the time the new COIN
doctrine was promulgated, though it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this since
the process that generated the sample of reports in the Logs is unclear. An additional
interesting but inconclusive fact is that the majority of the reports produced by the search
are also clumped around the time the new counterinsurgency doctrine was being
implemented in early 2007 (see graph 1) and then decrease in frequency. Graph 2 also
portrays the report frequency for the key-string "leader engagement", a specific type of
operation reported in the logs aimed at engagement with key tribal and government
leaders. Some of the reports assayed below are drawn from this broader search as well.
1076 of the 1169 documents from the "leader engagement" search, and 101 of 114 of the
"tribal leader" matches come from Regional Command East, so the analysis below does
not necessarily cover much regional variation in strategy. A large number of them cover
provincial reconstruction team (PRT) reports. Focusing on the work of these groups
should reveal how the military viewed the purpose of providing positive political
incentives: the question is whether these were viewed in a Model 2 view as a way of
inducing the neutral and homogenous population to support the central government, or in
a Model 3 view of inducing and empowering tribal groups such as militias to produce a
local political settlement that opposes the insurgency.
94 The search was performed using author's code.
95 After much experimentation, this key-string search was also found to outperform many
related searches in terms of producing a high density of reports related to tribal
engagements and meetings; related searches tended to throw up a lot of irrelevant data in
terms of the goals of the present analysis, e.g. injury reports and reports of firefights.
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The field reports allow one to see images at work directly: images tell you what
you're seeing, how to interpret it in terms of the value metrics and goals of the
organization, and what behaviors to chose in response to it. The field reports describe
specific operations and post-operation assessments of results. They thus provide evidence
on what types of operations are chosen in response to environmental stimuli, and how
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their results are assessed. They also generally illustrate the cognitive frameworks through
which the operating environment is interpreted.
In the first section below, I present a fairly random sampling of illustrative reports
from the "tribal leader" and "leader engagement" key-string searches. While I only
directly quote from a few reports, these were selected to be representative of the sample
of reports falling into similar categories (village assessments, security meeting reports, or
PRT reports). Overall, they show strong evidence of a Model 2 mentality, in line with the
prescriptions of FM 3-24 and the prediction of H3. Tribal engagement operations are
aimed almost exclusively at empowering the "Host Nation" central government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and are assessed in those terms. Model 3
thinking is not totally absent, however: in the second section, I focus on a specific and
widely covered incident in the war, the rise and fall of Combat Outpost (COP) Keating.
Operations at COP Keating originally proceeded in a Model 2 mode, as evidenced by
field reports; however, as severe manpower constraints began to hamper these efforts,
commanders at Keating shifted to a Model 3 approach of seeking political reconciliation
with the insurgents, as evidenced directly in the field reports. Additionally, interviews
with the commanders at Keating reported by the Washington Post reveal that these efforts
were undertaken in contravention of official policy, and were resisted by the
commander's superiors and the Afghan government (as in figure 2/3, t3a). Thus, the story
of Keating is broadly similar to that experienced by then-Colonel MacFarland in Anbar
and theorized by Jackson: after a long period of Model 1 and Model 2 experimentation,
the cumulative effects of resource constraints (in terms of manpower) and a willing and
creative ground commander led to brief Model 3 experiments (tl and t2). This both
validates the process model presented in figure 2 and figure 3 and confirms H3.
Additionally, the organization resisted these innovations and re-imposed Model 2 (t3a
and t4), though here this resistance came from an affiliated organization, the Afghan
government.
Field Reports from Afghanistan:
As noted above, Model 2 thinking should be evident in the field reports in the
types of operations chosen and how they are conceived of by commanders, and in how
their results are assessed.
Concept of operations:
Under Model 2, military forces attempt to engage the neutral population (-1, 0,
+1) in an attempt to build support for the government (+3) and erode support for
insurgents (-3). If this model dominates operations, tribes should be seen as a neutral and
homogenous group ("the people") whose support can be won or lost based on the
provision of positive or negative payoffs such as reconstruction efforts. They should not
be viewed as political actors in and of themselves, capable of generating a legitimate
political settlement.
The majority of the field reports clearly conceive of the tribes in this way. The
following report is representative of reports following leader engagement operations in
the Logs. It reports the result of a security meeting held with tribal elders and conducted
53
in concert with the Pech district governor (many leader engagement operations reported
in the Logs are conducted in concert with IRoA government representatives). Consider
the highlighted text:
Exhibit 1:
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20080123n1109 RC EAST 34.8727684 71.15371704
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2006-01-23 07:07 Non-Combat Event Meeting NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Hest nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
WL Report
CF Leaders Name: LTC OSTLUND, WILLIAM B.
Campany: Platoon: Positions Battalion Comander, Task Force
Rock 2-g03rd Infantry Battalion
Districts N/A Dates 23 JAN Of At (Location): Kunar
Provincial Coordination Center (PCC) in Asadabad
group Names N/A
Individual Name: Governor Rahkian
Individual Title: Peck Governer
Security Meeting Objective/Goals: Goal was to discuss security in the
Kereagal
Key Thames a Issues Discussed$
Governor Ramuan
AMP Chief Gulmanh Pashartoust
o One part of the body hurts, the whole body hurts the same goes
with Korengal and all of Afghanistan
0 What are you opposing, what for? Now long must we fight? How
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long must we die?
o If we do not take this opportunity now (coalition forces willing
to help re-construct the Korengal and bring peace), then who will we
rely on to help us stand up and survive?
o Do not make Korengal a sick place I
o Why fight back? You say there is nothing wrong then why do you
oppose?
o The ACM fight a false Jihadi
e
C
LTC Adam Khan
Security is everyones responsibility
Too much talk, too much shura, the time for action is now
o Foreign fighters ruin our hard work and our country.
e We (the ANS?) are not infidels, infidels dent pray, they dont go
to mosque, the disgrace Islam we (the ANSF) are Muslim, the same as
you.
o There is no need for Jihad. In our history there was a need for
Jihad against tyranny, against corruption. What is it for new? Jihad
against road construction? Against commerce? Against progress? This is
a FALSE Jihad, and it is wrong.
o Shura is not enough, be serious with our words today!
0 The ANSF and CF agreed not to fire during Ramadan and Eides; th
ACM still attacked
0 The ACM make business and decide to spill the blood of your
ses, all under the name of Jihad
o This (false jihad) is an infectious disease
e This is a golden opportunity to re-build and flourish we are
peer, when are we ever going to get this chance? The international
easmauity will not be interested in helping us forever
o Show me what the Taliban have done for you. Show me the schools
they have built, the mosques they have refurbished, the read they
paved, the supplies and food that they have distributed. Show so all
they have deae for the prophet of the Kerengal, show met
o Need my words, do not choose to kill yourself, or your country.
e Out of 20 dead in the Shuryak, 17 of them were Korengali
e Tell the ACM to turn themselves in, were ready to accept them
and make a better Koreagal together
e
0 The ACM rape your lumber, lead your seas to their deaths and lie
and intimidate you. What next? Where will they stop are your daughters
mant?
o Who will take responsibility for the security of the Korengal?
Korengali Elders (Sabyal Teacher)
o We do not oppose the government, we are with itt The Korengalis
are good people
o We are defenseless against the ACM so this is not our fault nor
our doing we do not feed or house the enemy
o What about the 18-19 people that you have detained? What
happened to them? We want then back.
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Other Meeting Attendees: Governor Rakman (Provincial Governor), LTC
Adam Khan (ANA Kandak aN CDR), LTC Byron (ANA 3!!), CPT Ahmed Say
(Koreagal ANA Commander) Gulnaah Pasharteust (Previncial ANP
Comander), Battle 6 (Koreagal Company Cemmander, CPT Mantle (FECC
OIC), SIC Rinojosa (F3CC MCOC)
Report key: 3A6410DA-3D69-49CS-A214-43S7A39S3006
Tracking number: 2008-025-000926-0437
Attack em: NEUTRAL
Cemlea atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TV ROCK 2-503 IN
Unit name: TV ROCK 2-503 IN
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MSUS: 4281D9685161050
CCIR:
Sigaets
Saeter: 3an
[Author's highlights]
The structure of the meeting is fairly clear from the report: coalition forces and
representatives of the Afghan central government presented a united front to tribal elders,
imploring them to support government efforts to provide security and oppose anti-
coalition militias (ACM, a -2 or -3 entity). Consider the five bullet points in the
highlighted section: while the tribal leaders of Korengal are implored to aid in the
security of the region, they are told to do so through the auspices of the Afghan National
Police (ANP), IRoA, and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), i.e. the central "host
nation" government. This is clearly obvious simply from the structure of the meeting:
coalition forces meet jointly with representatives of the central government and the tribal
leaders to bolster the legitimacy of the former. Additionally, the last bullet presents a
specific conception of how positive incentives such as road reconstruction are supposed
to operate: the governor states that support for the government's efforts can be traded for
reconstruction projects. This typifies Model 2 thinking: resources are directed at the
neutral population (-1, 0, +1) so as to coerce or induce cooperation with the central
government (+3).
The coercive, Model 2 tone of Lieutenant Colonel Ostlund is also fairly
unmistakable. In this engagement, coalition forces are facing a -2 or -3 entity, an anti-
coalition militia-that is, a fairly organized force opposed to the government and the
Coalition Forces. The operation featured in the report attempts to oppose them through
pressuring of the neutral population (-1,0, +1) to support the IRoA with a combination of
harsh words and potentially positive inducements such as further reconstruction efforts. A
Model 3 approach, however, would seek to engage the militias directly in an effort at
political reconciliation. While the existence of this report does not necessarily indicate
that these other efforts were not tried, Lieutenant Colonel Ostlund's exasperated tone is
fairly indicative of the attitude taken towards Model 3 approaches: in the last two
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highlighted bullets, he rhetorically considers and then rejects an explicit Model 3 strategy
of tribal mobilization of the Safi tribe for the sake of opposing the ACM.
The highlighted portions of the following two reports also reveal a Model 2
orientation.
Exhibit 2:
Rebereuce ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20060221n 1171 RC EAST 34.85280991 71.13514709
Date Type Category Afffliation Detsined
2008-02-21 14:02 Other Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
14 P3= Additional Summary Details:
On 14 FN3 08, the Kunar PRT moved with the provincial governor from
Abad to the bridge construction site opposite the Saw Valley and to the
Maray District Center OT conduct a greundbreaking ceremony. Over
recent months, the Saw elders have been taking a more active role in
the Naray District govt. along with engaging with CF forces to better
their villages and provide for their people. The Saw valley has been
disconnected from the west side of the river and everything it offers.
Theyve had a hilux-capable suspensiem bridge, but this truck bridge
being built along with a basic health post as part of the Kunar Realth
package, a school that 1-91 CAy coordinated through a MW donatios, and
other low-cost projects that provide a lasting impact - are creating
very positive effects.
The impact of this trip,
atleast initially, seems very good. Ulders and local loaders from
Naray, Ghasiabad, Asmar, and skigal were all at the groundbreaking and
the ceremony. Gov. Wahidi said he intends to do this more, to get out
with the people. As the joint PRT-Govt. element moved up the HSa to
Maray, multiple sub-governors and their shuras joined the convey to
take part in the day. People were out in mass to great the Governor as
he moved through their villages. Be stopped many times to shake hands,
introduce himself, pray with people along the road, and sometimes give
out gifts.
There was a prominent AMP presence along the entire M35, showing joint
coordination b/w districts and also the ability of the provincial CoP
to organise protection and police ops in the province. At the Naray
district center, where all parties moved to after the bridge
groundbreaking in Saw, the Naray AMP in conjunction with ANA from Naray
conducted security operations for the ceremony that was attended by
aprx. 250-300 people. The ceremony area around the district center was
cordoned off and guarded by the joint ANA-AMP elements. ALL personnel
entering the area were searched.
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All speakers tied security to development and
the development to opportunities for Kunar and Afghanistan in the
future. While security from ANP and ANA was talked about, many speakers
made mention to the fact that tribal leaders and elders of villages had
to do their part to just like during the fight against the Russians.
Comments such as these drew loud applause and cheering from the
attendees.
Where:I
Saw Bridge Construction Site: 42g TO 236 945
Naray District Center: 428 T3 298 010
Whe
Kunar Governors Maji Syed Faisullah Wahidi
unar Parliamentarian: Eaji Salee (from central Kusar)
Kunar Parliamentarians Sul Mar (female from merthern Kunar)
Maray Sub-Governor: Eaji GuI gamm
Maray CoP: Mad Ahmed Din
Naray Deputy CoP: Eaji Touseff
Naray Deputy Sub-Governor: maj I Bruaadine
Saw Valley Elders to includes Akbar Uam, Mullab Latif Ullah
Multiple Naray elders and members of district shura
Ohasiabad Sub-Governor: Mustafer Rham
Multiple shasiabad elders and members of district *hura
Shigal Sub-Governors Abdul Sahair
Shigal CoP. Mohamed Afsal
Multiple elders and local leaders frem surreunding villages.
15 M3 Sumary of Activities.
Mo significant activities reported.
16 733 Summary of Activities.
Mo significant activities reported.
17 F22 summary of Activities.
1) CA-North
KLZ with Farooq Jehan, subgovernor of Dangaum, who reports the ANP and
AaP have been holding meetings with the shura and elders from border
villages in order to improve border control in Dangum. Additionally,
Dangum will be appointing a new 30 person development shura, which is
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supported by Governor Wahidi. Fifteen of the 30 shura members will be
women. The shura and its female members are welcomed as a new
direction in development. Shura training will begin Wednesday at the
Asmar district center. The training will also be attended by new
shuras from Ghaziabad and Naray.
18 PER Summary of Activities:
No significant activities reported.
19 PER Summary of Activities:
1) EN
Performed road assessment of the Pech Valley road. Assessed Waygal
truck bridge and Waygal district center. Assessed three schools in
Waygal, which are the Bar Kanday school, the Tarale school, and the
Tantil school.
20 PE3 Summary of Activities:
1) CDR
Net with Governor Wahidi, his staff, the EDS Chief and the Chief of
Police in a weekly security meeting. Additionally, preparations made
for CODEL visit.
2) CM0
Net with Qudsia Majeedyar, a Kabul MO, to discuss USAID
women&apos;&apos;x training program funded through the British and
Canadian embassies.
21 FE Summary of Activities:
1) CDR / CHO
CODEL
Report key: 93CD3847-9FFA-48E2-3FS5-C6A9E3AE9DB4
Tracking number: 2008-052-145618-0609
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: ASADABAD PRT (351 CA an)
Unit names ASADABAD PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 428XD9520058799
CCIR:
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Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
This report shows strong evidence on the concept of operations held of provincial
reconstruction teams (PRT's): as the first highlighted section makes clear, assessments of
these engagements are seen in terms of their ability to bolster the legitimacy of the central
government, an explicit Model 2 approach. The next document is similar:
Exhibit 3:
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070602n727 RC EAST 33.13362122 68.83656311
Date Type Category Afffilation Detained
2007-06-02 18:06 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend CiviHan Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Last 24:
Summary of Activities: Unit: PRT I1NARAU DTG: 2007-06-02
Commanders Summary: (S//REL). Today was the Governors first day back
in Sharana after a week in Kabul discussing security issues with the
Minister of Interior.
At the Governors of fiee this moring were SoUA members from the
Sake Khel Sub-Tribe of the Khareti Tribe from the district of Sarebi.
(There are two main sub-tribes in Sarebi, the other being the Adi
Khel.) Attempts to build a new district Seater is Sarobi have been
hampered by a land dispute. Locals do met went to give up what they say
is their land for a new district seater. te Sake Khel tribe blamed the
Adi Khel tribe for being uncooperative is finding land for a new
district center. The SKURA members were there to secure the release of
some detainees taken earlier. The Governer was adamant about not
releasing them. This was a key engagement and illustrative of the
political effectiveness of the Governer. The Khareti tribes extend
around Barobi district north to Orgua, northwest to Sar Eawe, west to
Charboran, south to Gomal and to a small degree, east into Bermel.
There has been a great deal of ACM activity in these areas recently.
(In fact, 32 incidents including two attacks en the District Center in
Gormal in May alone.)
The Governor refused to help get these detainees released citing
poor security in these Kharoti areas and the fact that the Kharotis
were allowing Taliban foreos to live and oserate in their areas,
fichtine the aovernment.
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Also at the Governors office were the Chief of Police from Janikhel
and the District Commissioner from Sar Hawse (who was also acting
Police Chief). Notable exchange during this meeting was the governors
message to them regarding recruitment of ANAP applicants. He stressed
good pay, paychecks on time, quality food, and fuel problems would be
taken care of. He expressed a desire to make the Janikhel Chief of
Police the Commander for a new QRF force in Shaklabad. He stressed he
needed at least 50 recruits for this so the Chief needed to get hot on
recruiting members for ANAP training.
The Governor met shortly with the leaders of a new Provincial QRF
force sent from Kabul. He would meet later with them to discuss CONOPS.
Finally, he stated he was going to have NDS arrest the Chief of
Police and District Commissioner from Charboran District on the basis
that they have been implicated in the attack on the Gomal District
Center back on 4 May. Government vehicles stolen from the Gomal DC were
later found in houses that were associated with these two leaders.
From these exchanges it is clear the Governor has taken solid
actions to improve the security situation within the province.
One thing to note, the Governor expressed to me the importance of
continued support from the PRT in the area of monitoring ANP forces in
the District Centers throughout the province. He specifically cited
status reports from PRT district visits regarding number of ANP
personnel present at District Center headquarters, presence of the
Chief of Police, and supplies/equipment available to the ANP, are
invaluable to his assessment (and that of the Provincial Chiefs)
regarding ANP effectiveness and their weak areas.
CAT-A Team A, led by CPT Stockamp, continued their mission to
districts in western and southern Paktika. They plan to engage
district shuras and tribal leaders, conduct governance and project
assessments, and conduct district and village censuses regarding
numbers of police and teachers. They will also verify the identities
of district officials. They will RON in Shakhilibad after discovering
and clearing (with EOD) an IED hastily placed ahead of their route.
We have twelve of seventeen M1114s that are FMC. Four vehicles have
critical parts on order. We have three of four MK19s FMC; parts have
arrived from BAF. M2 slant is four for four.
Report key: 5B74109A-8D39-4ADO-9268-F8023C3F303D
Tracking number: 2007-153-175722-0001
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: SHARANA PRT
Unit name: SHARANA PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVB8475566112
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
This report again suggests that the concept of operations for reconstruction teams in
particular was focused on bolstering the central government. As suggested by the
highlighted section, the connection sought is between the central government (+3) and
the neutral population (-1, 0, +1) here assumed to be represented by tribal elders. This
contrasts with Model 3, in which non-state groups (+2, -2) are considered a source of
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political settlement in and of themselves, as in Colonel MacFarland's attempt to "flip"
whole tribes in Ramadi.96
One specific test of whether operations fell generally into a Model 2 or Model 3
conception in Afghanistan is the degree to which Coalition Forces attempted to directly
arm the tribes and empower them to police their own areas, thus treating them as an
empowered +2 or -2 entity. As discussed above in reference to the Anbar Awakening,
Colonel MacFarland and Marine Brigadier General John Allen sought to directly arm and
finance the tribes in order to induce opposition to Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQI). They
also cut deals with them to allow tribesmen to provide policing in their tribal areas, in
explicit contrast with the policies of the Iraqi government and coalition forces to use
police from outside of a specific district. They thus sought to empower +2's and -2's
rather than delegitimizing or ignoring them.
Some of the field reports from Afghanistan provide direct evidence that
MacFarland's ideas on arming the tribes and allowing local policing were specifically
opposed by coalition and IRoA forces. This indicates that the dominant image of
operations revolved around the application of coercive power to the neutral population
rather than engagement with more organized non-state groups. Consider the second
highlighted section below:
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070606n913 RC EAST 33.33778 69.95832062
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-06-06 15:03 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
UNIT: PRT KHOST DTG: 061930ZJUN07
LAST 24:
The PRT CA director attended the bi-weekly sub-governors meeting at the
governors office compound. Governor Jamal left early this morning for
business in Kabul and will return sometime next week. The Deputy
Governor conducted the meeting today and only six sub-governors were
present as well as representatives from DIAG. Sub-governors not
present were Nadir Shah Kot, Jaji Maidan, Bak, Mando Zayi, Gurbuz, and
Sabari.
PRT element in Qalandar remains with downed vehicle awaiting
additional repair parts. Anticipate re-supply GAC to arrive on site
tomorrow AM. If additional repairs do not work, alternative recovery
methods (e.g. air recovery) will have to be further explored.
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES:
6 Jim Michaels, "An Army colonel's gamble pays off in Iraq," USA Today (Friedberg,
Germany, May 1, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-30-ramadi-
coloneln.htm.
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POLITICAL.
Sub-governers meeting:
The deputy governor opened the meeting stating the three issues they
would focus on: securit recruitment in the AMA and ANP and the DIAG
rarm.
The Qalandar sub-governor reported that he received a list from DIAG of
people in the district who supposedly own illegal weapons. Of the five
on his list he sent four to DIAG and the fifth is now in Pakistan but
as seen as he returns he will send him to DIA also. The sub-governor
talked with tribal leaders about the anoe of them idin
serit in the distric.
The
galandar sub-governor said there are no problems with security in his
district nor are there any problems with the new DC site.
The Musa Khel sub-governor reported that security is good in his
district. Be wants the PRT to talk with contractor working on new
district center about the surrounding wall. Se says the contractor may
attempt to build wall on lose earth pushed frem the top of hill where
DC is being built. He also wants us to track 13-15 missiles he said a
villager in MK is voluntarily turning in. Ne doesat knew what kind of
missiles they are. The sub-governor brought up an issue that solicited
input from all sO.. He said that DIA4 contacted them via radio to
schedule meetings, etc. The S0s say that DIAG shouldnt call them on
the radio to schedule anything; it compromises security and allows ACM
te monitor and disrupt their actions. They recemend this type of
coordination be done via mobile or satellite phae.
Tho Spera sub-governor requested more police in a security meeting
about one month ago and was premised by the governor to get 45 more.
Se far he has only two. He reported that there is a group of about 250
ACM and are being lead by Mullah Mehmad Omar who works for Siraj
aqgani. Me said there are two other leaders there as well, but not as
senior as the other one. He just got this information yesterday and it
is unclear if he gave it to anyse else. Be said the people of Spera
are supporting the government more than ever before, and that security
is getting better, but he wants to address the concerns he has with ACM
movement in the district.
The Tore sayi sub-governor reported that security isnt as good as he
wants. District residents that work for the government or CP are
having their compound doors blown off, XX0s planted near their
compounds and receiving night letters warning them to not associate
with the local government or CP. The sub-governer has complied with
DRAG and sent some people form his list to them and they are now being
investigated.
The shamal sub-governor reported that security is OK in his district.
He held a tribal shura with over 100 participants and they are acting
on info from the PCC. He said that they give info to NDS but receive
no feedback or no info in return. They are looking for intel updates
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in order to address security concerns in the district. He talked about
strict measures he will implement against families and anyone who
supports ACM, including burning their houses. Be will soon have a
problem with police forces in his district as many of their contracts
are ending soon and they wont work anymore after that. But he also
said that the ANP in his district are now making almost as much as ANA.
The deputy governor then said that the increase they received was form
a bonus that they will receive every month unless they get a salary
increase. The sub-governor also said the Aft and ANP arent supporting
each other in his district and the he is not getting CF support for
MeDb discovered or turned in.
The Tani sub-governor reported that security is good but there is a
small group that is telling teachers and students not to go to school
in the district. He is getting good cooperation and coordination with
provincial security forces and talked about the visit to the district
center yesterday by the governer, AfA caonnuder, NDS chief and
Professional 6. He received the list frem DIAS and has already seat
some from it to speak with DEAG reps.
reported that they made the decision last month to prepare these
lists and send the people on the lists to speak with them. Their hope
is to get these people in and possibly get more names of people with
illegal weapons.
The deputy governor finished the meeting by asking the sub-governors to
do what they can to advertise in try to increase recruitment in their
districts for ANA and ASP.
MILITARY:
C fONICS/INFRASTRUCTURE:
USTR
SOCIAL:
INFORMTIONI
CF, while responding to an 133 in the Tere Say District were struck by
a second IED vic WC 998 002. No casualties or major damange to any
equipment reported.
SCHEDULED 10 EVENT:
Spera District Center Groundbreaking Ceremony
DC/PCC UPDATES:
NITR
KEY LEADER ENGAGEMENTS:
Non-scheduled
NEXT 96 ROURS:
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07JUN07:
PRT CDR, SECFOR
T: Conduct GAC to location of disabled vehicle in Nadir Shah Kot
District
P: Successfully return all vehicles and pax to FOB Chapman
08JUN07:
All Hands
T: Vehicle Maintenance and Refit
P: Prepare for equipment and personnel for the upcoming weeks missions
T: Rodeo
P: Provide Finance Support, Mail and Chaplin Services for all
soldiers/sailors
09JUN07:
PRT CDR/ J-2
T: Attend weekly PCC security meeting
P: Discuss provincial security concerns
10JUN07:
PRT CDR, DoS, ENG
T: Conduct Groundbreaking Ceremony at New Spera District Center
P: Show CF support for an important reconstruction milestone
Report key: 8F8ED907-F258-4132-9D78-BF461363AFDE
Tracking number: 2007-157-174256-0837
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: KHOST PRT
Unit name: KHOST PRT
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB8918189144
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Assuming that the sub-governor's policy on police working in their own districts reflects
Coalition as well as IRoA policy, this report suggests that Coalition forces pursued the
development of a more nationally oriented police force. This contrasts directly with
MacFarland's deal-making with various tribes to allow tribe members to police their own
areas. This policy assumedly allows militia penetration into the police force, supposedly
delegitimizing the force. MacFarland's approach treats local tribal militias as a -2 force,
i.e. a non-state organized political group that can possibly be co-opted into a +2 local
police force. The sub-governor's policy evidenced in the document above, on the other
hand, exhibits a Model 2 approach of treating potential police recruits from tribes as part
of the neutral population to be coopted into a structure of the federal government, the
Afghan National Police (+3).
The meeting described in the report above, and a few other reports in the "tribal
leader" search, indicate Coalition support for the UN Disbandment of Illegal Armed
Groups (DIAG) program. The DIAG program seeks to disband militia groups through
weapons collection programs and through providing socio-economic development
projects. A 2010 report from DIAG states their goal to achieve their goals through
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"assisting the Government of Afghanistan in disarming and disbanding illegal armed
groups, collecting weapons, and in delivering development projects to enhance socio-
economic outcomes in compliant districts."97 The military's apparent support for this
program again confirms a Model 2 bias: Model 3 approaches would treat local militias as
potential actors in a future political settlement, as was done in Anbar. The DIAG
program, on the other hand, seeks to disarm these groups in order to bolster the Afghan
governments monopoly on force, and additionally treats development projects as a carrot
to induce compliance. This approach fits the coercive approach to political war that
typifies Model 2 approaches in Jackson's analysis.
Overall, the "tribal leader" and "leader engagement" sub-sample of the Wikileaks
Logs show a strong Model 2 orientation in terms of the concept of operations portrayed.
Civil-military operations such as reconstruction are undertaken for the purpose of
inducing support for the central government, and the tribes are viewed as neutral players
who can either support the IRoA or oppose it, but are not seen as potential political or
military actors in and of themselves. The evidence in these reports confirms broader
reportage about the general structure of the strategy in the War in Afghanistan that
suggests that military policy favored working to bolster the institutions of the Afghan
central government rather than seeking local political settlements based on tribal power
and agency.98 Some commanders notably tried to break out of this image of operations, as
will be reviewed in the section on COP Keating below, but as in step t3a these
innovations were generally opposed by the chain of command and the Coalition-
supported Afghan government.
In the next section, I review limited evidence on the assessment or value metrics
side of the image concept.
Assessments:
The previous section presented evidence on the types of operations chosen in
response to the Afghan insurgency. In this section, I review limited evidence on how the
operational environment was perceived, another aspect of the dominant operational
image. This evidence mainly comes from assessments of village dynamics and in how
meetings with tribal leaders are assessed. How exactly was this basic terrain of the war-
tribal and village power structures-viewed and processed by members of the military? I
also present some evidence on how tribal outreach efforts were assessed. This
information should provide further evidence on whether they viewed -2 entities as active
agents in the political process or a neutral group to be coerced or induced into supporting
the central government.
97 United Nations Development Programmme, Afghanistan, Disbandment of Illegal
Armed Groups (DIAG) First Quarter Report, 2010,
www.undp.org.af/Projects/Q I .../ANBPDIAGQPRQ 1 _201 0.pdf.
98 Greg Jaffe, "Combat Generation: Trying to work with an Afghan insurgent,"
Washington Post (Naray, Afghanistan, May 17, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/05/16/AR2010051603492_2.html?sid=ST2010051603629.
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Considering assessments and perception of the operating environment first,
images should condition how the military organizations environment is interpreted by
conditioning perceptions and by dictating the types of information that the organization
seeks out. Images are cognitive templates, and organizations will pursue information so
as to fit it into those templates. The "tribal leader" key-string search turns up reports on
11 village assessment operations. These all proceed in a structured pattern which is
represented in the following report:
Exhibit 4:
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
APG200706O7n854 RC EAST 34.80860138 69.42311859
Date Type Category Affiiation Detained
2007-06-07 05:05 Non-Combat Event Meeting NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in actios 0 0 0 0
im 42 Conducts village Assessment of senjalay
Individual interviewed was Nasik Mire who can be reached at @7183565
Political.
*There are no TS in the area nor is there any To or 310 support.
eicte I
*fhere is se crime in the area.
*There has not been a solid market for goods in the area due to the
fact that there is not a high demand.
*Unemployment is the biggest problem in the area.
Socials
*The village i Pashtun.
*The women are uneducated and cannot run for local office. They are
allowed to vote however.
*The nearest clinic is in Dandar which is two hrs away by feet.
*There is a nurse in a nearby village that helps with emergencies.
Infastructure:
*There is a local spring which serves as a water source and is adequate
to support the villagers.
*There are no wells.
*The children attend school at the mosque because there are no nearby
schools.
*The only urban development is the building of schools.
Information:
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*The only source of media in the village is brought by word of mouth
from the shuras.
Report key: 1ADE28E9-671D-4D7C-3488-56B8SAD2D2D6E
Tracking number: 2007-158-111104-0567
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF GLADIUS (DSTB)
Unit name: TF GLADIUS
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWD3870051900
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
The first line assessing support for tribal elders is repeated in the other village
assessments. This evidence alone suggests a Model 2 orientation, as it largely views tribal
leaders, -2 or potential +2's, in terms of how they assist the people, -1, 0, +1.
Additionally, it is clear that the village is assessed in terms of central government
penetration in the second highlighted section. While the evidence in this report is
certainly not conclusive as to the conceptual frames of the military as a whole, the
information it pays attention to in village assessment suggests a strong Model 2
orientation.
Turning to meeting assessments, Exhibit 2 above shows some evidence of how
tribal outreach efforts were assessed, for example in the assessment that "Overall, this
was a well attended event that connected to local and provincial
governments to the people, but also connected the government to
itself . - Exhibit 1 also portrays military approval of the results of a security meeting
whose main purpose was to reinforce central government authority. Additionally,
consider the report below.
Exhibit 5
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070825n824 RC EAST 34.42477036 70.48674011
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-08-25 07:07 Non-Combat Event Meeting - Security NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
PRT Jalalabad
APO AE 09354
25 August 2007
MEMORANDUM THRU
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Civil Affairs OIC, PRT Jalalabad, APO AE 09354
Commander, PRT Jalalabad, APO AS 09354
SUBJECT: Trip Report for Chaparhar Key Leaders Engagement
1. SUNNARY. Civil Affairs (CA) and the PRT 10 conducted a Key Leaders
Engagement for the political and tribal leaders in the Chaparhar
District at the PRT (428 XD 36616 10253).
2. ACIROOUND
a. General. There has been an increase in 1a activity as well
as numerous reports of rocket and mortar POO (point of origin) sites in
Chaparhar in the recent past. The PRT Commander spoke with the
Chaparhar Sub-Governor and Police Chief at the Bub-National
Consultation about the security issues in the area and wanted to have a
luncheon with some village elders to further discuss ways to decrease
the amount activity.
b. Mission Specifics.
(1) The following Coalition Forces organizations were presents 173rd
8TS; TV Fury and TNT. The following Afghans were present: Muslimyar,
Chairman of the Provincial Council; Bayed Ali Akbar, Chaparhar Sub-
Governor; Tar Gul, Chaparhar Police Chief and Masood, Governors
Assistant.
(2) The lunch opened with Mullah Nassau Khan giving prayer and was
followed by the PRT 10 welcoming everyone to the POT. Lunch was served
and immediately following the PRT £O spoke again, but this time
addressing the security issues and 130 activity going on in Chaparhar.
The Department of State (DOS) Rep followed, speaking about how
successful the Sub-National Consultation (SNC) was and how the
representatives from Chaparhar did an outstanding job. the OS rep
transitioned into security by explaining how the SO projects that were
the result of the SVC cannot be implemented without a secure
environment. The STI 5-3 spoke next and also discussed security and
how it puts the Afghan children at risk because they are often the ones
who find explosives and bring them to the proper authority. Next, the
STS 8-2 spoke about IED activity in Chaparhar and how it has increased
in the recent past.
(3) The first Afghan to speak was uslimyar who addressed the village
elders and the Coalition Forces separately. Muslinyar addressed the
elders, saying that it is incumbent upon them to clean up the security
situation in their areas. The Afghan government and international
community want to help reconstruct the area, but cannot do so if the
security situation remains the way it is. Muslimyar aIso said that
they must eliminate the security issues so that it will no longer be an
excuse why the international community cannot implement projects in the
Chaparhar District. Muslinyar then addressed the Coalition Forces
saying that the Chaparhar elders have been proactive in trying to
reduce the amount of activity in the area by forming a securit council
and volunteerine to natrol their own neiahborhoods.
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Musilinyar asked for an addItIonal 100
ANAP to help reduce the activity in Chaparhar. Muslimyar was followed
by Sayed Ali Akbar, Chaparhar Sub-Governor, who spoke briefly about the
security issues, but mostly reiterated what Muslimyar said. Mawlawi
Abase spoke last. Rio attitude was different than that of Muslimyar
and Sayed Ali Akbar. Mawlawi Abass said that the people of Chaparhar
should be appreciated because of the IED, rockets and mortars that are
turned in to the proper authorities. Me also stated that security in
the past has been an issue because of the mistakes that Coalition
Forces have made. Mawlawi Abass commented that if CP reduce the number
of mistakes made then the security situation would be better.
3. Additional Data and Analysis
by some locals that were approached after the luncheon. It was
explained that is Mawlawi Abass personality and be has always been that
way. CA recommends that missions are conducted in the villages that
were represented today to see if the word is spreading throughout the
villages.
4. Point of Contact for this memorandum is CPT Middleton at 353 231-
7341.
Maurice 5. Middleton
C"T, CA
CAT-S Team Leader
Report keyu *5CS6CAC-C071-4FSB-ADCC-283723BB3413
Traeking numbers 2007-237-133526-0172
Attack ons NUTUAL
Coplex &tack I FALSE
Reporting units PRT JALALARAD
Unit names PR? JALALnAR
Type of unit: one Selected
Originater groups UNKNOWN
Updated by groups UNKNOWN
NMs: 421s366161025
CCIRS
sigaet:
DColer: 61333
The second highlighted section again shows tribal engagement being assessed in terms of
its ability to link local leaders to central government institutions, in the Model 2 mode.
(The last highlighted section presents further evidence on the policy of not allowing tribe
members to police their own districts.)
Overall, the sample of the reports reviewed above show a strong Model 2
orientation both in the concept of operations portrayed, in how the results are assessed,
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and in how the operating environment is perceived. These aspects of the dominant image
all conform to the military's dominant coercive image of its methods: even in evidence
on civil-military operations such as reconstruction, the purpose is seen as inducing a
neutral and homogenous population into supporting the institutions of the central
government. Operations are not conceived in terms of violent negotiation with non-state
political groups such as insurgent groups such as the anti-Coalition Militias (ACM) or the
tribes themselves. The approach is typified in villagers complaints from one report in the
"tribal leader" subsample: "The villagers repeatedly reiterated that they are stuck in the
middle between CF/ANSF and the ACM and that they do not have the power to rid the
ACM from their village and stop them from shooting at CF." This reveals the lack of a
Model 3 approach of arming villagers and tribes directly and the potential pitfalls of
trying to work solely through the auspices of the Afghan National Security Forces.
Exhibit 6:
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20071212n1075 RC EAST 34.9454689 71.04229736
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-12-12 09:09 Non-Combat Event Meeting NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0
Face to Face/Shura Report
CF Leaders Name: CPT Frketic, ILT Kauger, iLT Levay,
Kennedy
Company: Able Platoon: Able Co
Group
1LT Root, 2LT
Position: Able CMD
District: Watapor
Combat Main
Date:12 DEC 07 At (Location):
Group&apos;&aposjs Name: Watapur Village Elders
Individual&apos j Lapos; s Name:
1. Gul Dali Khan
2. Abdul Ahad
3. Eabib
4. Anwarullah
5. Abdul Jabar
6. Nazur Gul
7. Shah Wali
S. Zarif Khan
9. Mohammad Amir
10. Malik Rahimullah
11. Malik Abdul Wali
12. Malik Rahmatullah
13. Malik Mir Zaman
Villaget
Gambir
Asar Bagh
Gambir
Kafar
Mahsogal
Gambir
Mashogal
Gambir Paskalay
Kafar
Gambir
Garocharkalay
Katar Tor Kalay
Garo Shahid Kalay
0 0
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14.
15.
16.
17.
I.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
Gambir Paskalaymoor Mohammad
Mohammad Akbar
Sayad Asia
Malik Mohammad
Easrat Ali
Amir Sala
Malik Managar
Wasir Mohammad
Mehammad As in
Tagoub
Shawali
Malik Arsala Kh
Raji danat Gul
Kassan Af 
Kaji Abdul Mate
Abdul Gayom
Babir Khan
Mehamad Rasig
Mahtab
Gul Mira
GuL MOhammad Kh
majoballah
Rasrat Gul
Abdul Rashid
Sayedullah
Mir Akbar
Mohibullah
Rohullsh Amin
Matiullah
Individual&apos &apos;s Title:
Item of Discussion:
The CF expressed their respect for the Religion of Islam and their
concern to help the people of the Watapur. The CF stated that they
believed that there were two reasons why the Taliban fight against the
CF1 one, because the Islamic extremists believe that the CF do not
respect the religion of Islam; two, the Taliban fight for money because
they poverty stricken. Through deduction, since the CF do not
disrespect Islam, then the only logical reason why the Taliban continue
to fight is monetary reasons.
The Village leaders of the Watapur expressed their concerns and stated
that they continue to drive out the rebel fighters from their villages.
The village leaders thought that they should have a weapon per
household OT to possess the weapons to keep the Taliban out. The
elders expressed their interest projects coming to the Watapur.
The CF ensured that projects were on their way to the Watapur to
include a road, and to start with, small mosque refurbishment projects
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Katar
Katar Nurstan
Axis Katar Nurstan
Tsangar Jebi
Tsangar
Katar Nurstan
Katar Afghan
Gare kalay
Katar Ter Khail
Katar Tor Khail
an Gare Dak Kalay
Gambir Kalay
Gambir Sore Kalay
eon Tsangar
Tsangar
Tsaagar
Gambir
Watapur Mashagal
Gambir Kalay
an Gambir Norstaa Kalay
Gambir Norstan Kalay
Gambir Bar Kalay
Gambir
Gambir
Norstanokalay
Gambir Mans Kalay
Ghoadai Kalay
Shoedai Kalay
to build a trusting relationship. The CF emphasized the importance of
securit and that it facilitates rojects and developme.
Other Meeting Attendees (Name, Title) Media Interest? Describe Media
Presence, Interest, Coverage
PRT Assessment
Grade s
Line(s) of Operation Affected
Negative/Neutral/Positive
Counter Insurgency Operations
Develepment of ANSF Capabilities
Develop/Demonstrate GoA Capabilities
Promote ReAonstruction and Seek Econmic Development
Report key: EDD473A2-A541-4FO8-BADE-B7D2319D7F0
Tracking number: 2007-347-122021-0533
Attack en: EWUTRAL
CoAplen atacks FALSE
Reporting unit: TV ROCK 2-503 IN
Unit names TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Type of unit: None selected
Originator group: UNKOWN
Updated by group: UNoux
NaRS: 425Z0650168900
C2:'I
sigaet:
DeCler I eNSU
It is important to emphasize that the selective evidence presented above is not
conclusive as to the effect of the dominant military image on the course of operations, as
it presents a limited picture of overall operations. Nevertheless, the field reports present a
rare, undiluted internal view of military discourse that seems to support the view that
Model 2 thinking dominated COIN approaches in 2006-2009. If these reports are indeed
representative of broader trends in the Coalition's strategic and tactical approaches, they
suggest a strong Model 2 orientation.
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Reports from COP Keating
Despite the dominant Model 2 orientation of the US military effort in Afghanistan
suggested by the evidence above, the field reports do show evidence at some tentative
Model 3 experiments at reconciliation. Graph 3 shows the results of a key-string search
for "reconcil" (to pick up "reconciliation", "reconcile", "reconcilable"): as the following
reports show, the GIRoA and Coalition wasn't necessarily opposed to reconciliation with
insurgents (see the highlighted sections of the exhibit 6 above). At the same time, this
was not pursued as an explicit goal of operations but rather as a result of military
pressure, thus fitting more of a Model 1 than Model 3 conception. While tribes were
pressured to turn in militia members, it does not seem that they were directly armed or
funded in order to facilitate their direct military opposition to insurgents. It is also notable
that, in some ways, the IRoA pursued a Model 3 approach even as Coalition forces
didn't: as suggested by some of the reports above, Afghan government forces were not
shy about pressuring tribes to rein in insurgents themselves, even as no policy existed to
give them the resources to do so (except through the auspices of the ANP or ANA).
Graph 3:
"reconcil" frequency
source: Wikileaks Afghan War Logs, author's calculation
One operation in which Model 3 was explicitly tried was the latter half of the
engagements surrounding COP Keating. As the story of Keating has been well-
documented, focusing on the field reports from this incident should allow us to get a
fairly full picture of events and examine how well Jackson's model of the determinants of
Model 2 and Model 3 innovation fits the data.
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Combat Outpost Keating was a remote combat base in Nuristan Province
established in 2006 to support provincial reconstruction teams99. It was located in the
Kamdesh valley in Nuristan Province in a deep bowl surrounded by high ground. The
establishment of the Combat Outpost followed changes in tactics reflecting innovations
mentioned above in the example Colonel Sean MacFarland's Ramadi operations: the
practice of locating small combat bases in locations dispersed among the population in
order to facilitate the new protect-the-population strategic paradigm.100101 Thus the
new FM 3-24-inspired COIN orthodoxy became the new dominant strategic image for
operations in Afghanistan following its apparent success in Iraq. The question is whether
resulting operations actually followed Colonel MacFarland's Model 3 approach, or the
Model 2 approach that is more in line with the military's dominant MOC image.
The story of Camp Keating in terms of counterinsurgency strategies' is one of
Model 2 failure and tentative Model 3 experimentation. After an initial period of
enthusiasm for COIN following the establishment of the outpost, it quickly became clear
to commanders at the base that they lacked the resources to conduct the sort of
population-centric counterinsurgency tactics that were becoming standard doctrine
following the Iraq "surge." 0 3 The account in the Wikileaks field reports paint a picture of
quickly deteriorating security around the base, with insurgents conducting increasingly
sophisticated probing attacks culminating in a final assault that led the military to
abandon the base. It was only late in the life of the COP and following its demise that the
erstwhile base commander, Lt. Col. Robert Brown, turned to a strategy of funding and
arming a local power broker, Mullah Sadiq, whose followers were suspected of taking
part in the Keating attacks, in an attempt to generate local stability."" It was thus only
after a long period of experimentation and a flirtation with total failure, combined with
resource constraints on military forces, that led to a brief Model 3 experiment. The story
thus fits Jackson's model and echoes the experience of Colonel MacFarland in Ramadi.
Initial Model 2 strategy
99 Bill Roggio, "Army releases report on battle at Combat Outpost Keating - Threat
Matrix", February 6, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2010/02/armyreleases_report on combat.php.
100 Fred W. Baker III, "Combat outpost serves as front line in Afghanistan fight I Article
The United States Army", April 1, 2009, http://www.army.mil/article/19059.
101C.J. Chivers, "Strategic Plans Spawned Bitter End for a Lonely Outpost -
NYTimes.com," New York Times, July 25, 2010, sec. Asia Pacific,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/26/world/asia/26keating.html?scp= 1 &sq=combat%20o
utpost%20keating&st=cse.
102 Controversy surrounds the COP Keating incident for other reasons, namely due to
allegations that the chain of command was not reactive to requests to close the COP and
that the deteriorating security situation in the surrounding areas was not responded to
with appropriate alacrity. There are also allegations that the COP was kept open for
political reasons, as President Hamid Karzai allegedly drew support from the region via
vote rigging (see, e.g. http://www.captainsjournal.com/category/cop-keating/)
103 Op.cit. Chivers.
104 Op.cit. Joffe.
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Despite being severely under-resourced for the task, military forces nevertheless
attempted to apply the new counterinsurgency doctrine in the surrounding Kamdesh
region. The new COIN doctrine was rapidly spreading quickly throughout the military (t4
in figure 3) and commanders at Keating attempted to implement its prescriptions:
Exhibit 7:
Reference ID
AFG20070130n446
Date
2007-01-30 00:12
Killed in action
Wounded in action
Region
RC EAST
Type
Non-Combat E
Enemy F
0 0
0 0
Latitude Longitude
35.40571976 71.31590271
Category Affiliation
vent OTHER NEUTRAL
riend Civilian Host nation
0
0
0
0
District: Kamdish Village: Agro HCA Type:
Location of Drop:
42SYE1030020500
Non-CDS HCA Date 01/30/2007 MGRS
Rice 5
Beans 5
Tool Kits 1
Blankets 14
Men&amp;apos;s Coats 14
Camp Keating overall assessment of Agru: Expressed their appreciation for
assistance and the continuing mission of the ANA and CF&amp;apos;s of
reconstruction of Agru. The general assessment is that the populace
generally viewed the distribution of Supplies by the ANA was greatly
appreciated for their support and showed support to the CF&amp;apos;s
and ANA&amp;apos;s mission in Agru.
Report key: FA69D92C-CD70-4DOB-9B1E-918B610A099E
Tracking number: 2007-033-010435-0159
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: -
Unit name: -
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SYE1030020500
CCIR:
Sigact:
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Detained
0
DColor: GREEN
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20061212n02 RC EAST 35.4169693 70.79104614
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2006-12-12 Non-Combat Event Meeting - Development NEUTRAL 000:12
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Agru Village Shura.
Meeting with Muhammad Juma, Head Elder. PRT Distributed HA to Agru
elders.
Discussion Items: Education
Problem Mitigation Before Next Meeting: Need tent for temporary school.
Additional Meeting Attendees: Ismatulla (Malik), Muhammad Jaleel,
Muhammad Juma, Sher Afzel, Mir Afzel, Zakir Hussein, US Attendees: CPT
Lanigan, Al
PRT Assessment: Agru Shura received 150 school kits (pencis, notebooks,
grammer exercise books, erasers, pencil sharpeners). Prayer rugs 25, sack
of shower kits, chlldrens gloves 24, socks, radios. ANA CPT Muhabeen and
his men acted as the government face on distribution. Agru elders have
visited Camp Keating several times. It felt good to reciprocate by visiting
them. Able Troop is upgrading a MHP there and we are trying to assist them
with their education efforts. We invited them to pick up school supplies at
the PRT at their earliest convenience and that we were workin on their
tem orar school Idea (tent).
Report key: E553E660-AED6-47C0-93A4-FB1C71997FEC
Tracking number: 2007-033-010244-0839
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: -
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Unit name: -
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXE6261120758
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
(emphasis added)
Reference ID
AFG20070216n559
Date
2007-02-16 00:12
Killed in action
Wounded in action
Region L
RC EAST 35.42
Type
Non-Combat Event
Enemy Friend
0
0
0
0
atitude
303085
Categi
OTHER
Civilian
0
0
Longitude
71.32961273
ory Affliation
NEUTRAL
Host nation
0
Blankets: Each: 30 per bundle: 8
Tarps: Each: 20 per bundle: 15
Radios: Each:: 10
Women&amp;apos;s Coats: Each: 40 per bundle:
PRT Assessment
The District Governor thanked coalition forces for the much needed NA In
their district.
Report key: 9F2BDO3C-BBE0-4AB4-BA1 5-7C8073ZCA545
Tracking number: 2007-048-081346-0104
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex stack: FALSE
Reporting unit: -
Unit name: -
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS:42SYE1150022450
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Detained
0
6
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
The three reports above all illustrate Model 2 thinking in line with that reviewed
above in exhibits 1-7: reconstruction projects aim at building support for the central
government. The primary thrust of outreach efforts is to produce legitimacy for IRoA
institutions (+3). The last report in exhibit 7 in particular illustrates the degree to which
the image of operations contained in the new counterinsurgency doctrine could color
soldiers interpretation of feedback from outreach efforts. The rapid deterioration in
security following this initial enthusiasm suggests that military forces may have been
deeply misinterpreting the attitudes of local leaders, as these very leaders may have
provided support for subsequent attacks.
An army report on the COP Keating incident, as well as a review of the field
reports, indicates that security rapidly deteriorated around the COP, with insurgent
fighters, presumably from the local area, engaging in increasingly sophisticated attacks
on the base."" Limited evidence suggests that, as the security situation deteriorated, US
forces engaged in some tentative experiments with Model 3 approaches, for example in
encouraging local leaders to engage in reconciliation efforts with insurgent fighters and in
pursuing a peace treaty with the tribes and (presumably) militia forces in the area:
Exhibit 8
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20071106n1205 RC EAST 35.42259979 71.32849121
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-11-06 15:03 Non-Combat Event Meeting - Development NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Atteadeos.
Sub Governer Anayatullya
ANSF: AMA CDR L& Meerullab, AS6 CDR Chrisrolla, AMP CDR Jalil
Kandesh: Jan Kabm==a, Abdul kare., Sidjaa, Shamul Ramsa, Pat* Khan,
moor Mahamad, Abdul hfar, Akter Mahamad, Akram Khan, Mahamad Salm,
Abdul Nahd
Kamus Mbark shah, Shulam Neer, Mahamad Easham
Mandagal: Uidullah, Neustafa, Naurul Age, Eashan Khaa, Mahamad Easham
Saner Sachs Malaei Abdul Kabir
Engagement Purpose. ge discuss the results of the village inputs *a the
Peace Treaty, the LOC break-dow for area of responsibility, discussion
n the land, dispute over Keating/Warheit, and proposing the
105 "Executive Summary - AR 1 5-6 Investigation re: Complex Attack on COP Keating
- 3 Oct 09", graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/AR15-6Sum.pdf.
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Prepared Talking Points / Themes / Messages / Subjects: Same as above
Desired Effects: A list to be provide to the CF of WHO will be
responsible for the security of the LOC, a proposal for a fair price
for renting Keating/Warheit for Bulldogs tenure in this A0, and results
from the Jirga held in Kandesh on 25-26 Oct 07.
Summary:
Prepared by the ANA CDR Approximately 100 people attended the Shure
held in Urmul. About 60 people from the Shura attended a lunch bosted
by the ANA ea Camp Keating. The Sub-Governor started the meeting and
discussed about soeurity is a huge problem and it is the Afghans
problem to fix. The ANA CDR was introduced for these who did net meet
him at the Mega-Shura and he explained that his wife was fren Nuristam.
LT Noorullah said he would do his best to serve his ceuntry and help
the Kamdesh district. Ihe problems they face are not tee difficult te
accomplish if the whole district would get involved. If some villages
allow imsurgents to stay the night, feed them, and provide them with
weapons they are met supporting Afghanistan. If they do not do these
things the insurgents will move to other places and we would have
security. The elders agreed they would have everyone help with
security and so one would harm the construction contractors.
Prepared by Aasyatullyas report: Malawie Abdul Kabir started the *hars
by reciting the ely guran. He added that supporting the government
was the only hope we have. Anytime you have problems you should first
report things to your elders. Se careful just killing people because
innocent people could get killed. Without the elders and the shuras
talking, we can not have peace. Anayatullya added that Afghanistan can
not have peace and stability by just criticisiag the gevermeat and
others. We cant keep wasting our time by talking soecurity and earn up
with plans to establish security. We should net say anything about the
CF because they cme to Afghanistan to bring peace and help with our
future. The ANA CSU from the Panjshare Tribe said the Maristani
people are hesest people and thats why the government is willn to
assist in security, education, and reconstruction.
If me do
not act new we will miss our chance. The AMP CDR Jalil added be agreed
w/ the AM CDR and the shura needs to meet with the shaors who did met
show and get their input on the security and peace plan. Mani from
Pitigal added ws need the same right from the government that ether
villages get. They should pay us for reconstruction of Pittigal
because they help destroy our village. We can build reads by the
people of our village so we do not need the contractors. The final
person to speak was Abdul hafar security must be the first thing we
try to fix. If we get security we can have a bright future.
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Additional Information:
Upon receipt of the additions and omittions to the Peace Treaty, I will
submit the Treaty to Saber to have it translated and vetted. We have
added the US input and ensured the leaders we would stick to our
agreement and encouraged them to do the same. To move forward,
everyone must be willing to adapt to changes and continue to promote
and support the IRoA.
Report key: ODA3DD56-AF6E-4296-ACB8-8A31B7AlD17F
Tracking number: 2007-318-150330-0024
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF SABER 1-91 CAV
Unit name: TF SABER 1-91 CAV
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SYE1140022400
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN
Here we see US forces moving towards a Model 3 conception of operations, most likely
in response to severe manpower constraints, in line with Jackson's model: the PTS
program refers to the Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation
Commission, a halting Afghan government attempt to induce Taliban fighters to
reconcile with the government.'1 6 The report generally features the units around Keating
attempting to shift to efforts at reconciling insurgent fighters.
Following a massive attack on COP Keating on October 3, 2009, the base was
shut down and the remaining assets were bombed by the air force to prevent looting.
Following the COP's demise, the erstwhile commander at the base, Lieutenant Colonel
Robert Brown, engaged in a genuine Model 3 approach at pursuing stability by entering
into negotiations with a local power broker who had engaged in a long battle with the
Taliban for the allegiance of local fighters, Mullah Sadiq." 7 Sadiq, who had been on the
US kill-capture list since 2005, had been a commander in the anti-Soviet insurgency and
had fought with Hezb-i-Islami, a group led by warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Under Brown's direction, in the months after the demise of COP Keating US
forces began financing Sadiq's local militia forces to the tune of $25,000 a month, which
he organized into an informal police force. The Afghan Army also began supplying him
with guns. The deal held for some time but, according to a Washington Post analysis,
began to fall apart as US forces began to face resistance to the deal from the Afghan
government, who feared that Coalition forces were empowering Hezb-i-Islami. Thus the
broader counterinsurgent organization began to oppose the Model 3 approach, as in t3a in
figure 3, though the US military itself was willing to go along with these experiments. In
106 4
Patrick White, "Fewer Taliban insurgents defecting in Afghanistan | ScrippsNews,"
Toronto Globe and Mail (Kandahar, Afghanistan, January 7, 2010),
http://www.scrippsnews.net/content/fewer-taliban-insurgents-defecting-afghanistan.
107 Op.Cit. Joffe.
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an interview with the Post, Brown speculates that his replacement in command in
Kamdesh wouldn't face the same incentives to work with Sadiq. 08
The story of Keating thus follows the contours of Jackson's model: COIN in the
FM 3-24, Model 2 mold had become the new conventional wisdom in Afghanistan, and
dictated the concept of operations at Keating.'0 9 The persistent effects of manpower
constraints and task pressure arising from failure to generate security in the area
promoted brief Model 3 experiments. These experiments, in turn, were resisted by other
forces in the counterinsurgent organization, though this resistance was more likely the
result of Afghan political dynamics than the professional biases of the Afghan Army as in
Jackson's model. Nevertheless, resource constraints seemed to play a role in encouraging
a persistent commander, Lt. Col. Brown, to attempt a Model 3 approach of promoting
stability through reconciliation with a former insurgent, Mullah Sadiq.
Conclusion:
In line with H3, the evidence from Afghanistan, where the newly institutionalized
counterinsurgency doctrine in FM 3-24 was being deployed following its publication in
late 2006, suggests that these approaches generally followed a Model 2 concept of
operations. Additionally, FM 3-24 itself contains a strong Model 2 orientation. This
suggests that the dominant coercive approach to performing its core tasks, as embodied in
the Military Operational Code image, exhibited a strong effect on how the military
approached unconventional war.
One may wonder if the Model 2 approach of supporting the development of a
legitimate central government in evidence in Afghanistan was really the result of a
coercive bias in military thinking. Perhaps this was simply the only way to pursue
population-based stability operations given the complex human terrain of Afghanistan's
tortuous relations of tribal power.
Along this line, it is interesting to note that British Forces operating in same areas
as US forces though in the 1920's through 1940's faced similar challenge of containing a
protracted insurgency led by the infamous Fakir of Ipi, yet developed very different
tactics for providing stability. As Andrew Roe remarks in a insightful analysis in Waging
War in Waziristan, these tactics were successful enough at producing peace in the tribal
regions of Waziristan that the Pakistani government largely kept them in place until late
2001 and the invasion of Afghanistan by Coalition forces and attendant US political
pressure. He concludes that many of these tactics could be used today if Coalition Forces
dialed back their expectations of what could be achieved in terms of promoting a
democratic, centralized government in Afghanistan. Many of these tactics typify a Model
3 approach. For example, Roe concludes that the payment of allowances to tribes, the
employment of locals as political officers and the hiring of indigenous scouts, and the
empowering of tribal police forces have all been successful at pacifying the tribes of
108 ibid.
1 Though it should be noted that the outpost was originally established to intercept
fighters crossing the Pakistani border. Op. cit. Chivers.
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Afghanistan and winning their support in broader efforts to contain insurgent forces.""
These efforts also typify the Model 3 violent negotiation approach to counterinsurgency
theorized by Jackson. Consider Roe's description of how British forces dealt with tribes
suspected of supporting the Fakir's insurgency:
Annoyed by the upsurge in violence, the government announced to a Madda Khel
jirga on 8 February that they must give security to the Fakir or expel him from
their land. The jirga denied the presence of the Fakir in their territory but were
told that the government did not accept their denial and that the onus was on them
to prove he was not with them and to explain where he had gone. Adjourning for
a short time, the jirga reassembled, stating that given extra time they would make
every effort to encourage the Fakir to live among them at peace or, failing that,
would evict him. Accordingly, an extra ten day's grace was granted to the tribe.
However, the tribe proved incapable of meeting the government's demands and
were attacked by aircraft as punishment."
The concept of operations as violent negotiation with non-state political groups is clear.
The British treated the tribes as genuine political actors rather than as a passive
population to be induced into supporting a central government. One may argue that the
central government infrastructure at the time was less extensive, promoting such a policy,
but a lack of central government coverage arguably also describes Afghanistan today.
A more compelling explanation of this difference in approaches between the
imperial British and the Coalition approach is that the goals of the US government and
the British government were quite different. While the British aimed at stability in order
to allow imperial trade to proceed, the US engaged in a much more maximal policy of
promoting a fully functioning and representative central government. Additionally,
whereas the US approach was dominated by military forces, encouraging a military
professional bias, British forces featured a greater balance between civilian imperial
officials and military leaders, arguably leading to a decidedly different conception of
operations. Recent evidence suggests that US forces may have dialed back their
expectations in this regard under the influence of increasingly concerned civilian
officials, and have started to experiment with Model 3 approaches such as reconciling
and negotiating with Taliban forces." 2 The US military and British imperial forces also
had differing time horizons, with the US military expecting an end to operations at some
point in the future while the British imperial effort was open ended in nature; this too
may have generated differing incentives to invest in unconventional approaches.
110 Roe, Andrew, Waging War in Waziristan, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence,
Kansas, 2010, 253.
"' Ibid. 178-179
12 Matthew Rosenberg, "U.S. Secretly Met Afghan Militants," Wall Street Journal
(Washington, DC, October 5, 2011), sec. Asia News,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052970204524604576611233949274212.html.
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The preceding case study of various military campaigns in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan confirm the hypotheses stated above: in line with HI, conventional solutions
both dominated the early approach to the war in Iraq and colored the interpretation of
subsequent strategic failure. The military's Model 1 approach can be contrasted pointedly
with the CIA's initial efforts in the War in Afghanistan, which followed a Model 3
approach of working through the tribes of the Northern Alliance. It took a long time
indeed for large numbers of US forces to take tribal engagement seriously. When these
innovations did occur, as in the case of Colonel Sean MacFarland's operations in Ramadi
and then Lieutenant General Petreaus's Mosul operations, the were attributable to
creative commanders with their own unique guiding images of operations, as well as to
resource constraints, in line with H2. Civilian intervention played less of a role, as many
of the innovations preceded the "surge" orders that were undertaken due to changes in
administration policy. TI and T2 of the process model are borne out as well, as initial
innovations clearly stemmed from the "image drift" attributable to the original thinking
of ground commanders reacting to the exigencies of the operating environment. Only
later on did civilian pressure push the military organization towards institutionalizing
COIN (t3b), and ample evidence suggests that they also resisted this adaptation (t3a).
In line with H3, analysis of primary sources from the War in Afghanistan and also
of the counterinsurgency doctrine developed during the war and codified in FM 3-24
suggests that, when COIN approaches were institutionalized, they followed a strong
Model 2 orientation. As Jackson's theorizing suggests, this is not surprising as Model 2
approaches retain the military's dominant approach to performing its core tasks:
counterinsurgency is seen just like conventional war: the one-way application of
resources to the target. It is just that the target is expanded to include the neutral
population, and resources applied extend beyond conventional force to positive political
inducements such as development projects. This orientation is evident in how these
efforts are assessed, essentially in terms of whether outreach efforts brought the right
people together and promoted support for the central government. They are not assessed
in typically non-military, political terms such as their ability to foster local political
settlements.
Thus, if Jackson's theory is correct, the professional biases of the military to view
problems in terms of violent coercion strongly determine the types of operations they
chose and the way they interpret the operating environment and feedback stemming from
their operations. The evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan provide strong support for his
theory, pointing to the strength of its dominant image, the military operational code. The
evidence from Iraq follows the pattern Jackson identifies in his case studies, which cover
a wide variety of historical contexts and different levels of experience of the
counterinsurgent organization, suggesting that the military's professional and cognitive
biases-its dominant image of operations-indeed plays a crucial determinative role in
guiding its strategic choices. The evidence from the field reports in Afghanistan serve to
illustrate these cognitive biases, most evidently in the mechanical interpretation applied
to the results of political operations.
Chapter 4: Images and Organization theory
84
The preceding theoretical and empirical discussion was hopefully convincing in
establishing inductively that organizational images are an important theoretical concept in
the analysis of certain organizations. As Jackson argues, the MOC outperforms other
competing explanations of COIN strategy choice across a number of different cases, for
example theories emphasizing cultural influences, or variations in insurgent or regime
types, or organizational history; rather, the MOC--militaries' characteristic way of
seeing the world-determines their behavior in counterinsurgency engagements across a
wide variety of cultural and historical contexts. The case study above is another entry in
this argument. While images may be important for understanding militaries and COIN,
however, the image model foregrounds these "images" as a primary theoretical concept
in understanding organizational behavior in general. One may thus wonder what this
concept adds that is not already covered by concepts in the organization theory literature
such as standard operating procedures, organizational frames or "organizational essence",
or what the model in general adds beyond models already available. In this section, I
briefly review the model's relationship to other models and ideas in the literature and
clarify what I believe it adds.
Images as a basic analytical concept
One attempted contribution of the image model is to ground a theory of
organizations on primitive scientifically identifiable components that make up all
organizations. The early seminal works in political science on organization, such as
Simon's Administrative Behavior and Wilson's Bureaucracy, aimed at identifying the
basic components that would unify all organizational analyses." 3 Yet at present there
does not seem to be much consensus on the components that make up organizations. As
Allison notes in Essence of Decision, political scientists have developed some
characteristic ways of looking at organizations, e.g. through concepts such as standard
operating procedures, bureaucratic incentives, information processing theories, and
through various game theory formulations such as principal-agent theory. Yet no
unifying, agreed upon set of variables exist to characterize organizations in general." 4
"Images" as defined here offer a good foundation upon which to erect a theory of
organizations. As Simon and Chester Barnard note, organizations at root amount to
psychological entities, constructs in the brains of organization members that allow their
behaviors to be coordinated to some degree."5 In theorizing them, the primitive variables
"13 Op. cit. Simon, 50.
"4 One may argue that such unifying theoretical viewpoints are not helpful and, indeed,
as in common critiques of rational choice theory, counterproductive to good analysis,
since they are often applied inappropriately given their universalist appeal. On the other
hand, political science is largely the science of human organization, so it seems useful for
the science to have an agreed-upon framework for describing these objects of scientific
analysis. All sciences, despite their theoretical diversity, have an agreed-upon vocabulary
for characterizing their subject of interest, yet political scientists have yet to develop such
a language for addressing organizations.
115 E.g. Barnard refers to organizations a "system of consciously coordinated activity or
forces of two or more persons" (Chester I. Barnard, "The Function of the Executive",
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of interest must be psychological in nature as well. While a concept like "standard
operating procedures" provides useful analytical leverage, SOPs are simply physical
expressions of patterns of cognitive response: standard operating procedures simply
represent the forms of behavior that are normally triggered within the organization by a
given set of environmental stimuli. When the analyst observes SOPs in practice, they are
proxying for these patterns of mental response. Nevertheless, the "image" that SOPs
express is broader in its content than the SOPs themselves: e.g. "population-centric
counterinsurgency" is both a set of tactical approaches, but also an epistemology of the
battlefield environment and a philosophy of victory in specific types of conflict. Thus,
one term to give the set of ideas that make up population-centric COIN is perhaps an
"ideology" or "belief system", yet, on the other hand, both those terms don't cover the
notion of associated standard operating procedures within the organization, i.e. the
organizational capabilities developed to execute the ideology. "Images" encapsulate the
practical, physical responses of the organization to certain situations-the standard
operating procedures-but also the cognitive frames through which it sees reality, i.e. the
more ephemeral psychological aspects organizations. In reality, these are simply two
sides of the same coin: the patterned responses, both mental and physical, to a certain set
of environmental stimuli: they define how to see the world, including one's self's place in
it, and value it in terms of achievement of certain goals (the psychological aspect), and
what behaviors to chose in response to stimuli to achieve the goals (the physical aspect).
Though it is far beyond the scope of this paper to assert, it is not outlandish from the
current state of cognitive science that these "images" have a physical reality in the
memory structures of the brain.
Additionally, "images" as defined here have a long history in the political science
literature on organizational behavior, though they may not always be referred to directly
as such. For example, Morton Halperin and Priscilla Klapp refer to the "organizational
essence" of bureaucratic sub-entities as a determinative factor in their choice processes:
Organizations have considerable freedom in defining their missions and the
capabilities that they need to pursue those missions. The organization's essence is
the view held by the dominant group within the organization about what its
missions and capabilities should be. Related to essence are convictions about what
kinds of people-with what expertise, and knowledge- should be members of the
organization." 6
They go on to observe the specific "essences" of the military service branches and the
foreign service and CIA. The "essence" is thus part of the organization's guiding image.
Halperin and Clapp also explicitly refer to "images" as shared epistemologies and
operational philosophies that strongly determine organizational behavior.
Likewise, James Q. Wilson's seminal work Bureaucracies provides a long
meditation on the role of organizational images, though he may not refer to them as such.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 72) while Simon refers to organizations as
"the pattern of communications and relations among a group of human beings, including
the processes for making and implementing decision", op.cit. Simon, 18.
116 Op.cit. Halperin and Klapp, 27
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E.g. one of the primary theoretical concepts in the work is the "situational imperative"
faced by organizational operators: an organizations functionaries, who do the actual work
of the organization vis-a-vis the outside world, can develop a very different concept of
their job responsibilities from those set by higher-level organizational decision-makers.
Wilson gives the example of rookie beat cops who quickly learn that their actual job, day
to day, has less to do with enforcing the law, as the police academy would have them
believe, and more to do with "taking charge" and directly enforcing social order. This is
because the incentives they face while actually on the job-the danger of being a cop on
the street in threatening and uncertain situations-interacts with their personal incentives
to alter their guiding image for the job in a way that contravenes the broader
organizational image:
Now, it may be objected that a situational imperative such as "take charge" is not
much of a job description, especially if there are many different ways of taking
charge. This is true. What these difficult, face-to-face situations produce might be
described more accurately as an overriding concern with which the operator must
somehow cope. The situation defines the outer limits of his or her freedom of
action, and thus the outer limits of what will be determined by organizational
goals and individual personality."?
As Wilson notes, this phenomenon whereby operators' images become discoordinated
with the organizational image is at the root of a great deal of bureaucratic pathology: "the
heads of government agencies often ignore these situational factors and thus either allow
operators to manage them by instinct or induce them to manage them in ways that lead to
ineffectiveness, disorder and corruption."' " This story is similar to the story told in the
case study of Iraq above: lower-level units, e.g. in Anbar and Mosul, faced a situation
that challenged conventional approaches to fighting insurgencies. Under this pressure,
certain commanders developed a fundamentally different view of operations, i.e. a
different guiding image that eventually clashed with the broader organization's image of
operations. In sum, lower-level units faced very different incentives than higher-level
decision-makers and their guiding images "drifted" away from the organizational image
blessed by authority structures (tl-t2).
In addition to providing a basic theoretical grounding for understanding
organizations, "images" are highly observable phenomena via ethnographic methods. In
the analysis of militaries, doctrine documents and professional discourse offer fertile
sources for understanding an organization's dominant epistemology and prescribed
procedures for dealing with certain scenarios. More generally, interview evidence should
be replete with evidence on dominant organizational epistemologies.
Incentives and Choice: why images change
The organization theory and governmental politics models presented in Allison's
Essence of Decision both refer to several important concepts in the analysis of
17 Bureaucracy, Kindle edition, 10%
mibid.
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organizations that are touched on in this study: the organization theory model grounds
analysis of organizational decision-making on the notion that organizations largely
respond to situations via set standard operating procedures that possess their own inertia.
Present problems are thus addressed in terms of past problems (exploitation versus
exploration). SOPs only change through slow processes of iterative learning. Likewise,
the governmental politics model views decision-making largely through the prism of
competing interest groups within governments with their own epistemologies and goals,
and the processes by which they come to collective decisions. The primary insight from
this model is summarized by the classic phrase "Where you stand depends on where you
sit": as Allison and Zelikow summarize: "The diverse demands upon each player
influence priorities, perceptions, and stands."" 9
Both sets of insights from the organization theory and governmental politics
models are necessary for understanding the Iraq case: as noted above, the initial
innovations in Anbar, Mosul and elsewhere by Colonel MacFarland, General Petreaus
and others occurred through an iterative process of changing SOPs in response to on-the-
ground learning. Likewise, subsequent to these developments, the ascendance of COIN
into a full military doctrine involved battles between groups with divergent interests and
viewpoints, with Petreaus, Odierno and others outmaneuvering broad elements of the
chain of command to get access to the president and implement their new conception of
operations. Thus, while the organization theory and governmental politics models may
apply in different situations, with organization theory applying to more structured
organizations and governmental politics applying to less structured bureaucracies,
elements of both models are most likely present in many organizational scenarios: the
development of SOPs by sub-units proceeds in response to specific incentive structures
they face (their "situational imperatives" in Wilson's phrase), while the resulting
differential viewpoints and interests often lead to problems of broader organizational
coordination.
The image model thus treats these two viewpoints on organization within a single
framework: SOPs and images more broadly develop in response to specific incentive
structures, while they are coordinated through often conflictual relations between
organizational players. The form of this conflict can be encapsulated theoretically
through the notion of the distribution of organizational incentives (incentive supply and
demand): when two sub-groups have conflicting images, they may fight to promote their
preferred image to authority structures by attempting to manipulate the other group by
affecting their incentives (e.g. attacking their reputations, prestige, or expertise), while
members with authority may attempt to coordinate the errant images of sub-groups by
affecting their organizational incentives (e.g. budgets, promotions, access to decision-
making power, etc.). The results of these battles are then crystallized in a new
organizational guiding image with its own attendant SOPs.
One issue not addressed at length by either the governmental politics or
organization theory models in Allison's analysis is how interest groups form within
organizations, and why exactly SOPs change (besides simple failure); in short, they don't
address explicitly why images change. The image model above provides a specific
mechanism by which images change: they change through the interactions of individuals'
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incentive structures with the environment and with their memories: as in the example of
the burning stove above, the choices that images dictate in response to specific
environmental stimuli are the result of past similar experience in which incentives
(organizational or personal) interacted with the environment to dictate choice. We
remember how we got things we wanted from the environment in the past, so we follow
those methods when encountering similar environments in the future. This is a very basic
idea that nevertheless exhibits a stark contrast with rational choice theories: rather than
comprehensive rationality, we enjoy a form rationality highly bounded by our limited
memories and calculative powers. Thus, in response to failure, we are likely to engage in
exploitation of known solutions before exploration for new ones, in the words of James
March (reflecting broader viewpoints drawn from complexity theory); likewise, learning
in response to failure will generate new SOPs mainly by recombining older SOPs"0 and
random observations drawn from broader experience. Images thus change through an
ongoing process of choice and random experimentation and observation. Another way of
saying this is that organizational images change through the influence of other, outside
images in response to incentives (e.g. "common sense" comprises on such image
source).'
The relevant incentives in the Iraq case for theorizing the shifting guiding images
of COIN were not what one would normally consider an incentive: these "personal
incentives" often amounted to incentives of individual commanders to achieve success in
their operations. This is not the type of payoff one would normally associate with an
analysis of individual or group choice. Nevertheless, this view of incentive systems has a
solid grounding in organization theory and is supported by recent psychological research:
e.g. in "An Incentive Theory of the Firm", James Q. Wilson and Peter Clarke
differentiate three categories of incentives: material incentives like salaries and benefits,
"solidary incentives" arising from returns to simply being in an organization (e.g. the
status that may come with being part of a social club or the solidarity derived from being
part of a union), and "purposive incentives", i.e. those payoffs that members derive from
achieving the organization's purpose, e.g. "job satisfaction". While "solidary" and
"purposive" incentives don't seem like important payoffs compared to money or other
material benefits, recent psychological research suggests that the belief that workers are
doing meaningful work is a very significant input into their personal feelings of
happiness and, by extension, to the productivity of the organization.
120 op.cit Allison and Zellikow, chapter 3.
121 The Iraq case shows this process at work: e.g. commanders who did relevant academic
work to counterinsurgency, such as H.R. McMaster, used this experience to craft a very
different image of operations in response to the imperatives of their operating
environments, drawing on broader sources of images than the organizational guiding
image. op. cit. Ricks, 72.
122 E.g. the Gallup organization estimates that low worker satisfaction costs the US $300
billion in lost worker productivity annually, while researchers Teresa Amabile and Steven
Kramer note that from a large case study of worker diaries that a primary source of
worker well-being is the belief that they are making progress on meaningful work. Teresa
Amabile and Steven Kramer, "Do Happier People Work Harder? - NYTimes.com," New
York Times, September 3, 2011, Opinion edition,
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If the notion of incentives is expanded to include these non-monetary payoffs, it is
easy to theorize processes of authority and group coordination via the notion of a supply
and demand of incentives: e.g. an individual military commander may have a certain
notion of how to conduct operations in his area that contravene the ideas of his superiors.
Thus, his purposive incentives lead him to a differing image of operations. To correct this
drift, they could alter his material incentives, e.g. threatening to dock his pay or rank, but
in a tightly structured organization that exerts a hegemonic influence on one's life like a
military, this step is probably unnecessary. Rather, they may simply imply that his non-
compliance may threaten his chance of promotion or his reputation in the organization,
which is a way of distributing negative "solidary" or, simply, "organizational" incentives.
Indeed, many professionals, like military professionals, respond to non-monetary payoffs
having to do with following the codes of their profession (e.g. doctors, engineers).
Additionally, cultural constraints that are also non-material in nature also constrain
choice.
More generally, Wilson and Clarke note that organizations' ability to coordinate
behavior over a large number of individuals can be understood according to their
dominant incentive structures. E.g. business firms that are organized around material
incentives may not be able to extract sacrifices from their members as easily as those
organized around purposive incentives, such as certain volunteer service organizations
like the US military. Thus, the guiding images of organizational sub-units are determined
both by the organizational incentives members possess, i.e. those incentives related to
following the organizations rules, but also the outside incentive structures they face (their
"personal incentives"). E.g. an employee of a business firm with considerable outside
employment options may have a less malleable guiding image than one with few outside
options; a doctor with significant professional incentives may be less amenable to
guidance from hospital management than an orderly. When analyzing a given
organization, it is thus useful to differentiate their organizational and extra-organizational
("personal") incentives and payoffs as the image model presented in chapter 1 suggests.
Applying the model more broadly
This paper has aimed at sketching the elements of a general theory of
organizations. The model developed here should thus apply to other political phenomena
besides military behavior. Indeed, the model here presents a characteristic view of
politics in general as one of "image competition": organizational and (by extension)
political outcomes are determined by a battle over the adoption of competing
understandings of reality (images). As such, the theory developed here shares an interest
with the various strands of the "new institutionalism" in the social sciences with
providing general theoretical conceptions of political behavior.'
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/opinion/sunday/do-happier-people-work-
harder.html?_r-1 &scp= 1 &sq=job%20satisfaction&st=cse.
123 Peter Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms," Political Studies XLIV (n.d.): 936-957.
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To take one example of the utility of the theory, we can deploy the image model
on the issue of insurgency itself: insurgencies are organizations, both in the common
sense of having an organized structure and in Simon's sense of constituting a shared
mental plan for action. Petersen, in Resistance and Rebellion, theorizes insurgency as
comprising a spectrum of roles, ranging from neutral individuals (0), to unarmed or
unorganized individuals (+1) who may e.g. attend protests or mass meetings, to locally
organized militias resisting the regime (+2), and finally to mobile, armed insurgent
organizations (+3). One can think of this spectrum as a spectrum of organization
members in the insurgency depending on the mix of organizational versus personal
incentives that structure their guiding images. +1's act mainly on personal incentives,
+2's begin to act on organizational incentives, and +3's are coordinated mainly through
organizational incentives.
Petersen theorizes that specific mechanisms move individuals along this spectrum
of insurgent support. The image model views the choice to join an organization as an act
of allowing ones guiding image to be colonized by the organizational image; this choice
is guided, as in Simon's satisficing model, by an explicit calculation of payoffs based on
the individual's (limited) memory, past experiences, and calculative capacity. E.g.
mechanisms that move individuals from 0 to +1 include resentment formation, threshold-
based safety calculations, status considerations, and "focal points". Writing about focal
points, Petersen comments:
How do those resentful of a powerful regime find each other and communicate to
one another the desire to resist? They use focal actions that embody symbols that
are clear and unambiguously anti-regime. [...] For example, singing or humming
a religious hymn is an act of resistance against an atheist-totalitarian regime, and,
importantly, others immediately recognize that particular act as resistance and an
indication of risk acceptance.
In other words, the decision to move from 0 to +1 and become an informal member of the
rebel organization (in a broad sense) results from a communication of future potential
payoffs or incentives. I.e. the focal point of the hymn communicates to those who hear it
that they will receive support from others for the cause-solidary and purposive
incentives-if they join the rebel organization, and to join it at the +1 level they simply
need to accept the guiding image by singing back. Thus, the focal point communicates
potential payoffs in terms of known past payoffs as in the bounded rationality model,
with the hymn representing a ready community of support for the rebellion. It thus serves
to identify an alternative image to compliance with the dominant power and may start a
process that culminates in the establishment of an organized rebellion.
The formation of rebellions at the early stages can thus be seen as the random
generation of a new guiding image in response to various mechanisms that affect
"personal" incentives and choice, e.g. safety calculations and resentment formation. The
move to a more organized rebellion, +1 to +2, should involve the distribution of more
explicitly organizational incentives (i.e. those incentives related to following the rules
1 Roger D. Petersen, Resistance and Rebellion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001) 37.
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and procedures of the organization) as the rebellion image becomes more sophisticated
and pervasive. As Petersen notes, these may include explicit organizational incentives
and payoffs such as community norms of reciprocity, as well as salaries and other
trappings of formal organization.'
As this example and the discussion of the Jackson model above shows, the image
model can be applied to various issues of organizational or political participation as well
as to the structure of organizational decision-making. In this sense, it attempts to purvey a
theoretical "paradigm" for analysis of politics in the style of Allison's "models" of
foreign policy decision-making rather than a specific theory of a specific phenomenon.
Conclusion
This study has aimed at sketching a general model of organizational behavior
based on the concept of "images"-information sets that guide human and organizational
choices. It has also attempted to validate it by showing that an entire class of military
behavior-the prosecution of counterinsurgency campaigns-can be theorized based
upon the notion of the dominant military image; I attempted to do so by reviewing a case
study in line with Colin Jackson's image-based model of counterinsurgency behavior,
arguing that, if Iraq and Afghanistan can be explained in these terms just as the other
cases in his study, the notion that organizational images matter is bolstered. I have also
attempted to present some ethnographic evidence of the effects of the dominant military
image via the field reports from the War in Afghanistan.
The view of organizations presented here may seem simplistic and highly
mechanical, and perhaps not very widely applicable. Nevertheless, I have attempted to
argue that this simple, mechanical view of images as represented in figure 2 can serve as
a useful framework in analyzing all forms of organization, and is indeed reflected in
seminal works of political science. Organizations are nothing more or less than shared
mental maps; they should thus be theorized in these terms. The basic assertion of the
theory is that, while the processes that lead to the formation of images of operations may
be complex, how images operate and clash subsequent to this formation is quite
mechanical, and can be summarized through the concepts of incentives and authority,
which amounts to the distribution or organizational incentives. It remains to be seen how
useful this pithy conceptualization may be, but this study has hopefully been convincing
in showing that in one particular, complex area of organizational behavior-military
decision-making-the notion that organizational "images" play a strong role in
determining behavior is compelling.
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